.. palaeontological reflections on the Tractatu s Paper read at the Wittgenstein Colloquium of the Seminar for AustroGerman Philosophy held in Oxford in January 1978. B~ry Smith Research Fellow Department of Philosophy University of Sheffield. \ \ \, .. i \ -* CONTENTS § O. Methodological Preamble I 1o Der Satz a 2o Legal Philosophy and the Tractatus § 3. Wittg~nstein and Reinach 8 4. The Concept of Stratification 12 § 5. The Background of Scientific Psychology 18 e 6. Wittgenstein and Herbart 23 8 7. Herbartian Pedagogy 42 § 8. The Experimental Psychology of Tbinking 50 8 9. Wittgenstein and Hlmsel 61 APPENDICES: I. Addenda to the Bibliography of Pre-Tractarian Occurrences of the term 1Sachverhalt' II. A Short Glossary of Meinongean Terminology in the Tractatus 66 III. W. Jerusalem and the Context Principle 71 IV. A Sketch of Some Connections between Austro-German-(Cambridge) Philosophy and Early Experimental Psychology 73 BIBLIOGRAPHY 74 Acknowledgments. For various kindnesses I should like to thank David Bell, Rudolf LUthe, Brian McGuinness, Kevin Mulligan, Christo! Ny{ri, Peter Simons, and Professors Herbert Spiegelberg, Christian Thiel and Dallas Willard. I also wish to aclalowledge the generosity of the University of Sheffield in its support of my present research. ... * .... ~:* ~* !i£ithodologica.l Preamble What follows is not intended as a self-sufficient account of the Traotatus, but ~ather as a series of . preliminary thought-experiments intended to suggest ;.:o!l-!!"'fol:e -14-neso-:finve &t i:gationin -elation ~to Wittgen.stein..!..s arly. thought ,. _______ _ scme of which may prove philosophically fruitful. Those which do, combined with other, more familiar approaches (through Frege, Hertz, Principia, Schopenr.~ue~, Mach, lCa.nt, etc.) could then be used to provide the necessary complete <..1,;c-.mt. l:nis shol.ll.d serve to forestall two sorts of criticism: (i) that these :::*afleotions are 'unbalanced': it is nowhere stated explicitly, for example, did so"' much as that Wittgenstein;raad Fraga during the period in question; and (ii) that they m83' undervalue the originality of Wittgenstein,by repeatedly failing to give * due weight to the hypothesis that Wittgenstein may have himself invented a concept, problem, or term, independently of eny anticipations, of .the types disou1sed below1 in the works of Austrian and German philosophers and psychologists. But even where this hypothesis does in fact correspond to the truth this need not deprive the parallels involved of all philosophical interest in relation to the Tr.aotatus. For the latter is notoriously indeed shamefacedly a work shot through 'irith gaps at crucial points. And it seems at least conceivable that en investigation of the typical ways in which these gaps were filled by other, contemporary philosophers employing similar conceptual machinery •8\Y' have some ohmce of proving helpful in our understanding of the internal implications of Wittgenstein's thought. There is a third sort of criticism, which I certainly ~annot hope to forestall on the basis of the present (highly preliminary) version [of an essay parts ot which I hope to include in an introduction to my English trenslation of Rei.Dach 1911]. This turns on the factual errors and misunderstandings which the paper contains. I ask only that such criticism be merciless. .... ... 1 § 1 Wittgenstein's copy of the manuscript of the Tractatus, the copy seen by his colleagues during his time as a schoolteacher in Lower Austria, bore the title Der Satz, a title which may well have accompanied the familiar, more cumbersome titles (Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung / Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus) in Wittgenstein's mind even in the time before the work was pubaltemative lished. The English philosopher's temptation is to translate this/ title simply as The Pro;positron, despite arguments such as those presented by Shwayder (1954) and Schwyzer (1962) which suggest that a more suitable translation would be The Sentential Act (or perhaps: The Linguistic Act). But can this title be translated at all if we are to be sure of being adequate to Wittgenstein's intentions in using it? For each of these suggested English translations is a technical one, carrying none of the non-technical meanings associated, in German, with the word '~\ To get some idea of what is at issue here let us recall the manner in which the Tractatus was written (or composed, as we might well say). Almost every day Wittgenstein would write down his thoughts both personal and philosophical in notebooks. These thoughts he would then sift and order, transferring those with which he was satisfied to further notebooks, deleting others as ppj_losophically irrelevant, sometimes removing whole sequences of thoughts which he had come to regard as resting on dubious insights. But Wittgenstein's conception of those propositions which remained, and which are set together in the Tractatus, was not the conception õ one who is satisfied with that which is left over after a process of sifting and extracting. Much more must we conceive Wittgenstein's attitude to the totality of his thoughts as being that of a fishmonger to a barrel of fish. The fishmonger extracts from the barrel wl)ich items for his own personal use and item~he can sell: the whole fish; 2 thenhe extracts also of what remains that which can be easily removed. But there is ii. residue of bones and oil and gfils silted at the bottom of the barrel, and the name for sediment of this kind in German is ~ ~, the leavings, the waste. Sometimes Wittgenstein was optimistic about the value of his work. He believed himself 'to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the probl.ems' (p.5). ~~in German is a leap ( *~ grossen, mttchtigen, kUhnen, eleganten . Satz~ einen Graben,. Sometimes he was less optimistic. ~ ~ in German is what things will fetch, the market price: here is the sediment 1 Wittgenstein is telling us, for what it's worth. In sifting his thoughts Wittgenstein was also, of course, putting them into order. But not into any linear order: thanks to the numbering system of the propositions we have to deal rather with a complex interleaved ordering system, long numbers fitting within shorter numbers fitting in turn within still shorter numbers bounded by the whole book as container: * *~*, in German, is the name for a ~ of Chinese boxes, and has the connotation of any closely fitting ordering system. Of more philosophical importance for our understanding of Wittgenstein is the meaning of '~' as a set of objects which belong together, especially in lan8'-.\8.ge relating to machinery (to engineering). Thus ã is a set of tools, of drills, of machine parts, of lamps, of billiard balls, of playing cards; . finally a Satz is a set of furniture,(which reminds •s of Wittgenstein's remark at 3.1431: The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, books) instead of wr~tten signs.) 3 This also throws light on the inadvisability of the philosopher's identification arrived at under the pressure of mathematical language of 'set' in English with 'Menge' in German. The latter has the primary meaning of * mass, crowd, quantity, and the secondary meaning of class or extension; but it lacks aD"f . . connotation of the English 'set' (in !!!~set, etc.). There is a parallelism of language and music in Wittgenstein's works. {).141: 'Der Satz ist kein WHrtergemisch.-(Wie das musikalische Thema kein Gemisch von THnen). 1 Cf. the important but little noticed parallelism between (say) Klavier spielen and Sprache spielen in Wittgenstein's later wor€J. Ã is,of course, any self-contained section in a piece of music, especially a complete movement (as it is a self-contained section in a game). But there is something more. ]2!!: Satz in logical and linguistic contexts now centrally denotes the proposition - not the result but or sentence itself; it originally denoted/the activity of Setzen, of positing, asserting, articulating, ordering. As alreadjr indicated,we find it necessary to adopt that interpretation of the ~tatus which rests on an identification of S§tze with just this kind of linguistic activity. What is interesting, from this point of view, is that in musical contexts this meaning of Satz is still - • very much alive: ,!2!!~ Satz is the activity of composing sections of music,where of this involves the setting together /a number of tones. Thus Wi6land, describing a particularly fine section of a piece was led to cry out: KUnstlichkeit des Satzes, Freiheiten irn Satze, stranger Satz: gelt ! da ist doch reiner Satz~ fiiessende Melodie ! (What artistry, what freedom, what strength of composition: how true ! this is pure composition, the melody simply nows t) Perhaps, therefore, we should translate Wittgenstein's title sanewhat as follows: •As it is also in the context at'the composing room of a printing factory. ""2 ,j w • 4 The Dregs (for what they're worth). {I have, in a manner of speaking, staked my life• on this tightly stacked nest of boxes relating to the activity of composing or articulating sentences, melodies eventually also moves in a game: on the one hand it is a great leap forward; on the other band it is no more than sediment, attained by rather dubious scrapings of the bottom of the barrel of language after everything that is sayable has been removed: anyone who understands me will eventually recognise these leavings as nonsensical.) The nest of boxes was a trial to Wittgenstein. Life itself was a trial to Wittgenstein. If he did not die in the trenches he was convinced that he would commit suicide. Very much on his mind, therefore, was the problem of hie •• estate after his death. A term with which he would at this time have been familiar was the term 1Abhandlung• which in Austrian (though not in German) law designates a trial, indeed a specific kind of trial, the trial for the determination of a person's estate after death. (See ABGB ~797). We might therefore reasonably ask following Waismann •••whether there. is a:. deliberate legal c.Omiotation built into the title, Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung ,which the work bore when ac*cepted for publication . in a philosophical journal. (Perhaps Wittgensteinthought that the shorter title was too good for philosophers). We can point to four important works as candidates for having had some influence on the style the numerical style of the Tractatus: Hertz's Mechanics, II Principia Mathematica, the Bible, and the Osterreichisches BUrgerliches Gesetz- ~,(t~e Austrian civil law code). Wittgenstein notoriously thought that *~ ~ = stake in a poker game. ••• See p.2 of Shwayder, 1954. •~including his philosophical legacy 5 his work consisted of two halves, a written and an unwritten half, and that -1t was the latter, the unwritten half, which was the more important of the two. We encounter a further legal metaphor if we look for indications which might help us to understand the unwritten portion in such accounts as we have of Wittgenstein's attitude to life during the time in question. That which can be said relates to the facts ,!:a the world; that which cannot be said relates to that which is beyond the world. Engelmarm (1967) reports that the image of God as the creator of the World, hardly ever engaged Wittgenstein's attention, but the notion of a last judgment was of profound concern to him. 'When we meet again at the last judgment' was a recurrent phrase to him, which he used in many a conversation at a particularly momentous point. He would pronounce the words with an indescribably inward-gazing look in his eyes, his head bowed, the picture of a man stirred to his depths. (rp.77f). and The notion of a day of judgment,/of the associated rewards and punishments, gives structure, we might say, to the region which is outside the world, the region of which we cannot speak. I am not yet in a position to exploit this claim in such a way that it would throw light on Wittgenstein's meaning at the end of the~- for supposing tatus, but I can give several independent reasons /that an investigation of Wittgenstein's thought in the light of legal theory may prove fruitful. The first of these reasonsturns on the parallelism which exists between the terminology of logic and the terminology of law, a parallelism which has existed, it seems, ever since the time of Aristotle. Consider,for example, the concepts of Gesetz, Grundgesetz~ Gesetzm~ssigkeit (Frege's 1893, the Grundgesetze der Aritbmetik,contains a discussion of the several meanings of the term 'law' followed by an explicit comparison of logic with an arbitrating judge, p.XIX)~ ev i *dence (but not Evidenz in German); the Husserlian triple Intentio, Constitutio, 6 Fundatio, each of which owes its origins to the terminology of Roman law~ proof, Beweis, justification, judgment, Urteil, sentence (pass sentence = das Urteil fttl.len); foundation; Begrtlndung, validity, Geltung; argument; rule, ruling, form, formula, formality, legimation, etc. What is significant for our purposes is that in the Tractatus this parallelism is extended even further: there is a constant emphasis oñ~ sein (being the case), (Wissen Sie,wie die Sachen sich verhaltan?cdo you know the_facts of the case?), (Verhalten •behaviour, conduct), Die Welt zerfttllt in Tatsachen (1.2), etc. How close the Tractatus comes to problems in the philosophy of law can be seen from a consideration of a paper by the legal theorist Gerhard (son of Edmund) Husserl on the nature of the legal trial,(1955). Despite the relative lateness of this essay and the very many conceptual and terminological parallels with the ~ractatus it seems from an investigation of G.Husserl's other works that an influence of Wittgenstein upon him has to be excluded. The paralfirst of all lels ought rather to'be explained, I would argue,/by appeal to the commoninflllence on both philosophers of the framework of ./:..ideas pr6sented in E.Husserl's Logical Investigations and in (related) works cf Meinong and Stumpf, and secondly by appealing to the fact that one central idea of the Traotatus, that of the picture theory of meaning1 seems to have come to Wittgenstein whilst he himself was reflecting on the nature of a trial~atter reading a newspaper report of a Paris trial pertaining to a traffic accident in which models were introduced into the court. (Cf. Wittgenstein, 1961, p.7, 29.9. 1914).For Husserl's paper begins with a discussion of~!• pictures,as these are used both inside and outside the context of a court: "Die Darstellung," he tells us (p.146), "ist Bild eines Etwas. Sie ist nicht dieses Etwas selber." It is not essential ~o the picture that it be a picture of something which exists 7 or which once *existed: Es genUgt, dass das Dargestellte den ~ eines Wirklichen hat. Abgebildet kann nur warden, was wirklich sein k6nnte wenn es nicht w:Lrklich ~ oder war. Die Abbildung ist selbst ein Ding der Wirklichkeit. Sie hat ihren Platz in Zeit und Raum. Ihren Sinn erhlil.t sie aber dadurch, dass sie auf etwas anders verweist, das sie das Bild nicht selber ist. (p.147) [rt is enough that something is represented which has the ~ of something actual. Only that can be depicted which could be real whether or not it is or was real. - The depiction is *itself a thing of reality. It has its place in time and space. But it acquires its sense in being referred to something else, something which is not the picture itself.] Thus when, on the stage in the theatre, the hero falls to the ground after having been 'stabbed:' by a dagger there is no real murder committed: a murder is represented~ one which took place, Perhaps, in the 16th century. We experience not a real murder but rather a state of affairs represented in a picture ein im Bilde _dargestellten Sachverhalt (p.147) •which exhibits the essential characteristics of a murder. We might say that the two states of affairs, the depiction which unfolds upon the stage and the original murder itself, have in common. an identical kernel of sense,Csinneskern, p.148). It may seem, Husserl continues, that there is no connection between affairs of * the law and mere pictures, which belong to the world of aesthetic appearance. Far legal affairs are real, they have consequences, th~fulfil an eminently practical goal • Yet nevertheless, he goes on, it does not follow that the law cannot use depiction, Abbildung, of real processes as a means t6 the fulfilling of this goal. No legal process springs out of nothing. It is set in motion in order to solve some given problem, whether this is the death of a man, the breakdown of a mar8 raige, the breach of a contract, the foundation of a trading company, or what have you. The lega1 order clearly wishes to come into contact with actual f~cta (facts which are, in general, facts of human behavio_yr._) ._This me.eta no-0pecial difficulties where the legal norms function between human beings without any the intervention of mediation of a legal process. Problems arise only with/ such a process, For facts, as -such, as entities which unfolded themselves in the past, can never themselves be experienced in a subsequent legal trial. Somehow a depiction of these facts must be created, using the materials available to and within the rules of procedure laid down by the court. What now is the means by which these states of affairs in the past are brought to representation? Typically,of course, we employ speech, but we may also, as G~Husserl points out explicitly (p.150), appeal to pictures or to three-dimensional models. Now the judge, in making his judgment, does not attach the relevant legal consequences to actual facts, facts which he himself has really experienced, but rather to possible states of affairs depicted in the actually uttered sentences or in pictures or models presented to the court. These are introduced into the locus of the trial first of all by prosecuting and defending lawyers. The witness is then brought forward to testify whether a given depicted state did or did not actually take place, he being someone who actually experienced the facts in question. But what he introduces into the trial is once again no more than the verbal representation of .that which he has seen. And the judge cannot reach through the witness's reports to the past facts, anymore than he could reach through the preliminary depictions of the lawyers. Thus the judge cannot properly say of anything: 'this is an actual fact'. All he can say, and does say, is: 'I am convinced that the report of the facts given by this witness corresponds to 9 the truth.' _ (Cf.op.cit.,p.151). What is the difference between the depictions of the theatre and the depictions of the court'l Only this:: that relative to the pic*torial representations which take place in the theatre any facts which may or may not correspond to the depicted states of affairs are deliberately put into brackets, left out of accqunt, for the sake of our aesthetic appreciation of the play. In the court, however, this correspondence bet~een depicted statesof affairs and facts is precisely what*is put up for discussion. But because past facts cannot themselves be experienced in the court, the domain of depicted states of affair~, typically a domain determined by verbal reports, can never be transcended. So much for Gerhard Husserl's argument. But we here may go further than this. For let us suppose that the depictions of one court are called into question in another, second court, a court of appeal. Here the realm of depicted states of since affairs will be of' a different nature /the issues to be decided are now questions concerning the course of events in the original court. (The extent to which reports there followed the appropriate rules of procedure, etc.) But here too it is impossible to transcend *the realm of depictions: no matter how many times the issue is taken to appeal, along a whole succession of higher and higher courts, there can never be any access to the facts themselves. In a certain sense, therefore, there is in the world no intrinsically higher court of appeal. Only God, the guardian of ontology, can make securely well-founded judicial decisions, but for these we will have to wait for the day of jUdgment, and that is not in the world but beyond it. Something like this, I think, is what Wittgenstein meant (in the 6.4's)when he said that there is, in the world, 10 nothing which is intr~nsically higher. We could not even test the validity of one legal process by setting it against another quite different, somehow more adequate legal framework. For just as we can never measure the correctness of a clock by comparing it, somehow, with the passage of time itself, but only by comparing it with !another clock, (6.3611) so we cannot measure the adequacy of a legal framework except by measuring it against another actually presented framework and never by appeal to 'the law' itself. §;. One final reason for introducing legal theoretical considerations into the discussion of the Tractatus turns on the importance of the German legal phenomenologiat Adolf Reinach as the first philosopher to subject the notion of Sachverbalt to a rigohrous philosophical investigation. (See his 1911 and my discussions in!, and!)• Both Reinach and Wittgenstein were of Jewish descent, born at roughly the same time, and had in common certain important personality traits: both were extremely charismatic, and suffered from the exhausting effects of their philosophical thinking and teaching, though Reinach recovered from exhaustion not by watching films and reading detective magazines but by pla,ing games of dominoeso Both were passionate readers of Augustine's Confessions; and Reinach once remarked, in a very Wittgensteinian vein, that Thedi.fference between himself and others was that they needed a reason to be sad, while he needed one to be happy. (Oesterreicher,1952 p.89 ). Unfortunately /whilst Wittgenstein returned from the front, Reinach was killed in battle in 1916, shortly afte~ having been conve~ted to Christianity- ~d after having 11 sketched out, in the trenches, the main ideas of a vast work on our cognition of the Absolute•(it seems that Reinach was attempting to put into words-the second, unwritten half of Wittgenstein's Tractatus). The effect of Reinach's personality, ih this period, on those who knew him, is well-testified by the fact that, subsequent to his death his wife, his sister, his brothe:P. and sister-in-law and several friends and pupils one by one entered the church. Indeed his sister joined the Benedictine nuns õ Mont Vierge, Belgium, where Reinach1 s depth and piety had already become so well known that on the day before his sister arrived at the nunnery the Prioress addressed the Chapter as follows: Tomorrow we shall have the great joy of welcoming to our community a new member, who is, even according to the flesh, a sister of Our Lord. (!) (Oesterreicher, .2E_•cito 1 p.118). What is philosophically important about Reinach's works for our purposes, though, is that Reinach developed an extremely detailed philosophical method (which he applied not only in the field of law, but also in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, philosophy of language and,fina1ly, ethics and the Absolut;k At the very centre of this method was the concept of Sachverhalt, a term which,as I have tried to show elsewhere (see !) , Reinach uses in a manner which is closer than any ot.her philosopher of the time to the way in which it was used by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. For someone unfamiliar with Reinach 1 s works it is difficult to believe the extent to which Reinach employed the Sachverhalt concept in-the solution on Sachverhalte of philosophical problems. Reinach founds his philosophy of numbei/, for example, in explicit opposition to Frege and his definition of numbers as applying to (See his 1921a) concepts./ The whole of Kant's theory of analytic/synthetic judgments, the whole df logic and the theory of judgment, the whole philosophy of science including •cf.H. Conrad-Martius'~Introductioñto Reinach 1921. 12 the problems of causality and induction are all of them, in Reinach's works, reb*uilt around the notion of Sachverhalt, a phenomenon which, were it not for the Tractatus, would be quite unique in the history of philosophy. What I hope to show, in the final version of the present paper is that there are important reasons why Reinãh, with his legal training, found a central, and eventually an ethical and religious importance in the Sachverhalt concept. I hop.e to show also that legal-theoretical considerations may perhaps throw some liBht on that other early 2oth century Sachverhalt ontology expressed in the Tractatus. P.ein=.eh ~~c ~ot ~ icolat~d phtlvawphã.ne was rooted in a tradition which, in various guises, had achieved an important position in the German-speaking philosophical and psychological communities by 1911. I have said something else- • where about the strictly philosophical aspects of this tradition. In the second half of this paper I want to say something about the method as it expressed itself in psychology, and to show that there are here, too, important parallels with, perhaps even influences upon, the Tractatus. ~ J. First, however, I wish to make a short excursion into social philosoph;y. In .¥'+• particular I want to consider the notion of (social and intellectual) stratification; (note that this term * * * ;bas found its way into social theory from palaeontology, the science of fossil remainsl. It seems clear that there are certain societies in which the idea of stratification, of hierarchical ordering, of differences of level, is stressed, is freely accepted, in many different spheres; and other ' societies in which hierarchies are as far as possible suppressed, and in which those differences of level which survive are somehow camouflaged. Clear cases of the former would be medieval England with its hierarchy of King, barons, thanes, •Its leading figures were, perhaps: Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Stumpf and Ktnpe. 13 knights, freemen, serfs ••• , the British Empire in its heyday, and, of course, the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Typical examples of the latter, reduced *social orderings are England in the 1930's and •4o•s, and Austria after the fall of the Habsburgs. It is beyond my competence to draw any historical conclueione concerning the opposition between these two kinds of society. And nor do I wish to make facile generalisations concerning the relationship between the orde~g of a society and the kind of philosophy (reductionist or non-reductionist) to which it gives rise. (Not that I exclude the possibility of interesting results in this field: see, in particular, Ny{ri, 1972, 1974, 1976, 1976a). I want to make rather the much simpler point that those societies with highly conspicuous stratificational orderings (of various types) will demand the development by social theorists of conceptual machinery adequate to those orderings; I then hope to show that conceptual machinery thus developed has sometimes been adapted by philosophers for their own, perhaps quite different purposes. One particularly interesting example of conceptual advance in response to a stratificational social ordering is provided by the work of the 12th century legal theorist Henricus Bractonis (Henry Bracton): To oversimplify somewhat we can say that in the feudal system all land was the property of the King, but then also separate constituent parcels of this land were the property of different grades of lord, down to the individual clods of earth farmed by serfs. *. 14 There is a clear problem which arises when we ask how these different people could each of them own the same parcel of 1and. Before Bracton this problem had been purportedly solved by appea1 to different modi habend.i Ql.l the_different such . levels. Bracton saw, however, that there can be only one/modus 1 . that :1f a persan owns a thing then he owns -.it, and that is that. His solution to the problem was to deny that it is*'~ thing which is owned by all of these people. Rather we have to deal here with a hierarchy of different legal creations, higher-order intentional objects (in the terminology of Smith, :B, adapted from Ingarden, 1964/65, vol.II/1). Each of .these legal creations is related, in different ways. to the underlying clods of earth, but they differ amongst each other in occupying different positions in what we might call*legal space. These creations of law were called estates: ~he crown estate related to that parcel of land which extended across the whole country, but it was not identical with that land, as can be seen from the fact that the King had certain limitations on his rights relating to it. Individual lords of various grades below the King then each owned the appropriate estate, down to the tenants of lowest order who, according to the theory, were regarded as owning the land itself rather than any higher-order legal creation resting upon a set of tempora11y determined rights relating to the land. (For a more detailed and more accurate-account of the theory see • G.Husserl, 1969, and Plucknett, 1956). -~--------------------------------- - --- .•The notion of estate acquired a central position in English social and political life. As one jurist put it:'What a man had largely determined what he was. His status as a legal person depended on his legal estate and tenure in ' English land. 15 The polymorphous hierarchica1 society which was Austria-Hungary gave birth, in its social theory, to a stratificational ontology of a highly insightfUl kind, resting on a conceptual advance which was much more deep -~c~ \l\.j than that which had been effected by Bracton, since the ordering system which it involved was not one which could have been obtained merely by "reading off" en ordering of strata overtly manifested in aociety. I ref er to the revolutionary account of the capita1 structure which was presented by Carl Menger in his Grundstttze der Volkswirtschaftslehre .<Principles of Economics) of 1871, a work which served as an economic handbook to the Habsburg Empire during the period of economic and political liberalism which followed its publication. The notion of a capital structure was itself to a large extent original to the Viennese School of economics which Menger founded.• Hitherto it had been customary to take for granted the homogeneity of 11capita1" (as measurable, e.g., purely in terms of land, or in terms of money-in-the-bank), with a consequently devalued conception of the role of the capitalist. "11.e latter comes to be seen within Austrian economic theory. as having the indispensable fUnction of preserving the capital structure (and also, where possible, of developing it) in the face of continual changes in its determining conditions1 (changes, for example, in the availability of raw materials, in consumer tastes, changes caused by epidemics, wars and other actions of governments, and, of course, changes caused by the activities of other capita1ists). Oversimplifying somewhat we may sketch Menger•s account of this structure as follows: the economic activity in a society is of value only to the extent that it satisfies the needs of consumers, ioe. that it leads to the creation of goods whose purchase is held to yield an immediate increase in the psychic income of the purchaser. There are only certain goods, however, which have this quality (goods such as foodstuffs). Other goods (cooking utensils, for example) do ndt •other important members of the school include: Fovon Wieser, E.von BHhm-Bawerk, L.von Mises and F.H.von Hayek (the latter a distant cousin of Wittgenstein). For reasons which will become clear in the sequel, Menger's school has also been called the First Austrian School of Value-Theory, in virtue of _its manifold relations to the 'Second' such school, comprising especially Brentano, Meinong, Ehrenfels, Witasek and Ma1ly. See Eaton, 1930, p.16o 16 directly serve to satisfy any needs at all. It is of course on the word 'directly'which e~erything hangs; for each of the goods of this latter group can be used in some way as to contribute to the production of direct need-satisfying gõds. Meng~r called the first,_ ne_e~tisfying goods goods of first order. Goods-which ara used, in combination, to produce goods of first order Menger called goods of second order (for example: a cooking stove, a pan of water, raw potatoes, together with fUel, constitute a complementary set of goods of first order). Goods used to produce goods of second order (for example the knife which peeled the potatoes) me goods of third order and so on. Clearly it is nothing intrinsic to a good which deterin:ines its position, at any given time and in any gi.v~n ft)..!!~ti~~. in the rank structure: this depends exclusively on the decisions of the capitalist (and clearly within the Mengerian framework the housewife peeling and cooking potatoes is, to this extent, a capitalist).* The ordering of the rank structure is therefore an ordering which is dependent upon particular networks of acts of consciousness on the part of subjects who react, in determinate (but sometimes highly original) ways,to changes in the underlying conditions.by thereby cause changes in the rank structure which will, in their judgment, lead to increases in the psychic incomes of consumers. Clearly there is no suggestion that the capitalist should conceive himself as standing in any kind of conscious relationship to'the capital structure' as such (as if he were some kind of gardener, charged with the task of preserving the order of a large garden from season to season). His relationship is rather directly to the goods themselves (those goods which fall within the locus of his particular interests), and in this he differs from the consumer only in .that his interests include also goods of higher order within their orbit. It is in explaining the psycholpgical mechanisms by means of which the interests of the 17 capitalist express themselves in the market in such a way as to lead to the maximum of consumer satisfaction under any given set of initial conditions (especially conditions relating to the limitations on our knowledge at any given time) that Mangers greatness lies. And it was almost certainly this psychological achievement which attracted Meinong and Ehrenfels to Menger•s lectures philosophers in Vienna, both/revealing an important influence of the latter in their works on value theory and psychology. * To Ehrenfels, the titular father of -Gesta1t psyreturn _ chology~ we shalJ/below. Meimmg' s first major published work( 1894) he conceived ~s a generalisation of Manger's approach to economic goods (of _fir~t and lμ.gher order) to goods (valued objects) in general. In his. later . wor~s this generalisation ..,as ce.rried even further, -taking the fora of 8:. completely *general theory of objects (of first and hi&ier order). Now Meinong•s paper "On Objects of Higher Order" (1899) was among the "taks subjected to thorough txeatmart by Russell in the six articles which he wrote on Meinong during the period from 1902 to 1907, precisely the period between his discovery of the paradox in Frege•s Grundgesetze and his invention of the ramified hierarchy of types (the theory of types~ orders)! One is therefore tempted to suggest that there is an echo, in Russell's terminology of 'higher orders' and e.g. in the now so widely accepted terminology of 'higher order logics•, of Meinong's ontology and of Menger'srpsychology'(a suggestion whose philosophical importance consists, perhaps, merely in the fact that it reveals how inadequate is our understanding of the early history of mathematical logic in particular and of analytic philosophy in general, particularly as this relates to the thought of France, Germany and Austria). •see Russell, 19o4, 1905, 19o6, 1907 and the references to "the excellent Herr Meinong:" in his The Princinles of Mathematici:: (1qo7J). 18 §5• It is difficu1t for us to appreciate the extent to which psychol.ogica1 issues determined the course of philosophy at the turn of the century. Perhaps the best comparison would bethat between psychology at that time and logic m linguistics today: for each of these disciplines have, in order, broken free from philosophy, thereby determining across a wide front the problems and concepts which philosophers find important and the methods which philosophers have found themselves using. It is, I would claim, impossible to understand very niany worl'Spublished between, say, *1871 and 1921, without a very clear awareness of the role of psychology -in influencing (e.g.) the set of questions to which they are addressed. We can get some idea of the importance of psychology if we reflect . . that in the 18901 s A.Httfler, with the help of Meinong, wrote a two-volume introduction to philosophy, used widely as a textbook in schools and universities throughout the Empire, the first volume of which was, in fact~ a textbook of logic, the second a textbook of psychology~ Philosophy, then, at least from one point of view, was conceived as resting upon these two parts, logic and psychology, with, of course, manifold interconnections between the two. And what was true of Austria was no less true of Germany, nor of England, especially Cambridge, where, as we shall see in more detail below, scientific psychology first took root on this side of the channel. Scientific psychology began in Germany, effectively with Herbart's Psychologie a1s Wissenschaft, neu gegrtlndet auf Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik (1824/25). Herbart's influence in Germany combined with that of experimental physiologists (such as Weber) and physicists who had turned their attention to problems of sensation (such as Helmholtz) led to a veritable explosion of experim~tal psychology in that* country, especially with the work of Wundt and his school. 19 I f But Herbart's infl..uence was equally great4in Austria where the'empirical'(nonexperimental) psychology of Brentano was founded, a psychology which found important echoes not only in Husserl's phenomenology but also in the work of Meinong and /Stumpf ,and in the later experiments of the WUrzburg school to which we shall have to turn below. From the time of Wundt and Brentano experimental psychology became an Austro-german export. James and Titchener, for example, in America, represented the infl..uence of Wundt; Ward and Stout in Cambridge the infl..uence of Herbart and Brentano. By the time Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge psychology had been made into a compulsory subject for the Moral Sciences tripos; and for this subject Moore gave lectures some of which were almost certainly attended by Wittgenstein, lectures at which the principle textbooks were the works of Ward and Stout.(For references see Hallett, 1977). It was against this background that Moore had read and been so impressed by Brentano•s work on ethics, and that Russell had done his considerable work on Meinong, including a review of Meinong's book on the Weber-Fechner law concerning the intensity of sensations. Dawes Hicks and the American Critical Realists, too, were closely involved in the early growth of psychology under the special infl..uence of Meinong'e work. Dawes Hicks in particular served as an assistant in C.S.Myers Cambridge Institute for Experimental Psychology, the first such institute to be founded in England (as Meinong had founded the first in Austria-Htuigary). Experimental psychology was, when Wittgenstein arrived in Cambridge, already a highly technical subject,though and this will ha_ve important philosophical consequences for what follows one lacking~ kind of self-consciousness .or self-confidence. Yet it seems that Wittgenstein was already something of an expert (though one who always maintained a cynical stance relative to the discipline of psychology). Thus 20 for example he later showed himself capable of giving an explanation of the Weber-Fechner law in a way which suggested more than a mere knowledge of Ruãell's * Witt$enst~in r~view of Meinong's book on the subject (see / 19bZ, p.41); he attended psychological meetings organised by Myers; he exhibited a machine for measuring reactions to rhythms at the opening of Myers' new Institute building; and he ~-. ..:..rried out experiments of his own in Myers' laboratories. (See Wittgenstein 1974). This immediately raises the question as to where Wittgenstein acquired his knowledge of and his_ interest in the subject. The first possibility which sugSamuel Alexander gests itself is Manchester:/,the professor of philosophy during Wittgenstein's time there,was like most other major philosophers of the day a passionate follower of the fortunes of scientific psych~logy, having himself studied in the Freiburg laboratories of H. Mttnsterberg and, what will be important for what follows, having * maintained a correspondence with the German philosopherpsychologist Oswald KUlpe.• It seems also possible that Wittgenstein may have had contact with T.H.Pear, later Professor of Psychology at Manchester, perhaps even that it was Pear who put Wittgenstein into contact with c.s.Myers. Another possibility is that Wittgenstein acquired something of his knowledge .of experimental psychology during bis time in Berlin. We already know that as a youth Wittgenstein had read Helmholtz's works on the senses of vision and hearing, one of Wittgenstein's main interests being the psychology of music and •There is little evidence of any contact between Wittgenstein and Alexander in Manchester, though it has been conjectured that it was Alexander who was instrumental in sending Wittgenstein to see Frege in Jena. See Ambrose and Laaerowitz, 1972, p.2..7l. 21 sound. It seems hardly conceivable. that he would not have become familiar with the classic work on the psychology of sound since Helmholtz, the two-volume Tonpsychologie (1883/90), written by Carl Stumpf who had for l2. years been Professor of Philosophy and a leading figure in the intellectual and musical life of Berlin the musical capital of the world when Wittgenstein arrived. Every serious discussion of tm psychology of sound in general and of the psychology of music in particular published in the first decades of this century had to take accmmt of Stumpf's works. (Note also that there is a further, quite independent reason for supposing that Wittgenstein had some contact with Stumpf or with philosophers close to Stumpf, for it was the latter who introduced the term 1Sachverhilt' into the language of technical philosophy, and there is as yet no obvious explanation as to how Wittgenstein got hold of the term while working on the Tractatuso For details see Smith! and .Q.) The influence of psychological issues in the Tractatus seems obvious. We have, first of al1, the well-explored influence on Wittgenstein's early thought of Schopenhauer and Mach. In the text itself we can discern, for example in the 2.01's and 2o02 1s a stress on the knowledge of objects, on the manner in which • objects are given, on our being able to think a ~pace empty, and the examples Wittgenstein uses here and throughout the work, relating to specks in the visual field, to the senses of sight, touch, and hearing, are examples which belong to the experimental psychology laboratoryo In the 3's Wittgenstein introduces the though undoubtedly Fregean in origin term 'Gedanke 1 (thought) in a manner whicWpoints less tc:> the influence of Frege's •eternal realm of thoughts' than to the use of this term in the works of WUrzburg psychologists(di~cussed in detail below) .At 401121 Wittgenstein takes it for granted that psychology is a natural science, and here he explicitly compares •forms of speech which are* even more common in the Notebooks (see Witt~~nstein 1Qh1L 22 bis method not, indeed, to psychology, but to the philosophical •study of thought-processes,which philosophers used to consider so essential to the p~osophy. of log!o'• At 2021.~_we~findJ'/ittgenstein appealingto the -Necker -cube in his discussion of the perception of complexes. Most important for our purposes however is Wittgenstein's discussion of the problem of solipsism.. This problem, as Wittgenstein conceived it, was not simply a limit position from the philosopher's armoury of comical tricks; it was a central, foundational problem of the new scientific psychology: how, namely, does the psychologi.c~ subject break through the solipsistic circle of his perceptionR: thõeht~. feeli!!.ge, etc., to reach an objective world. Some followers of Brentano had denled that we could break out of this circle. It wae in opposition to this view that Theodor Lipps, grandfather of the Munich group of phenomenologists to which Reinach belonged, developed bis theory of empathy, a theory which was later adapted by Husserl for the solution of the same probleM. The philosophical ego, Wittgenstein1ells us, is not the human being or the human soul of which psychology treats, but the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world and not a part of it.(5.641). And solipsism, when all its implications are followed through strictly, coincides with pure realis~: The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without extension and there remainG the reality coordinated with it (5.64). These remarks remind us of the passage in which T.S. Eliot summarises the account of the soul defended by Theodor Lipps (1964, p.71)• *Beside Lipps and Meinong the central figure in this work -(a Harvard dissertation sub'l!itted by Eliot in 1916)is F. He Bradley, in whose thought also the philosophical~psychological. problem of solipsism . had played a central role, see Cho21 of his 1893. 23 The ~ and its objects form metaphysically one whole, a whole from which we can abstract in either direction ••• (p.79:) the soul ie,in fact, the whole world of its experience at any moment. In fact it seems clear that the central problem in the foundations of psychology in Wittgenstein's day was precisely the problem of the nature of the soul , of :.'he psychological ego, of the conscious subject. For the experimental psychologists, jealous of their new discipline, were forced into the position where they had to give an account of what it was, in their experiments, which they were investigating. Not the body or some part of the body (say, the central nervaus system), since this fell within the province of experimental physiology• And not the mind (or reas~n or thought or the understanding) either, in the sense in which these were then conceived, for they all fell centrally within the province of philosophy as this had been determined by the still-philosophical psy.cholog1 of the old, preexperimental days. Many conservative thinkers denied, indeed, that a science of poychology was possible at all:"'one of the chief conclusions of Eliot's dissertation, for ~xample, arrived at by standard Bradleyan arguments, is that psychology as science cannot exist, that all of its results must rightly be assigned either to physiology on the one hand, or to philosophy on the other. Wittgenst~, in contrast, was concerned to keep philosophy and psychology rigidly separate - (in this he was at one with Husserl and with Frege) and hence *his treatment of the problem of the nature of the soul at the conclusion . of the Tractatils. ~~ Now the first philosopher to have nilrtured the idea of psychology as a science was, as we have already seen, Herbart, and it is Herbart's solution to the problem: what is t~e object of scientific psychology? which formed the sta.."'1:ing-point for all subsequent solutions, ~eluding, as we shall see, the •This was certainly true of Kant. 24 50 \ 1..1~:ion proposed by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. Herbart is, perhaps, the cñc i ~1. lyimportant figure for any understanding of Austrian philosophy of the ~,~co."l.d half of the 19th century; his followers filled most of the chairs of philosophy in Austria during the period, and Merbartian educational p~ychology f omed the basis for the curriculum and teaching methods in educational estab- ~ . .l.snments throughouJ~ the impire. Herbart's theory of inhibition and of the unc:.nscious seems to ~ve influenced Freud's psychoanalysis•, and his philosophy influenced such important thinkers as Lotze, P'echner, •• Husserl, Frege, Lf,pps, Ward, Stout, Wundt, Mach, Avenarius, Bradley, and Riemann. It seems, then, that we must come to some fair impression of. the nature of Herbart's psychology, and for this it is important to realise the break with tradition which was effected in Herbart's works. Before Herbart metaphysicians had started with the mind as given; only :then were they led to consider the ideas (thoughts,acts ••• ) of the mind, and thus they repeatedly encountered the problem of explaining the relationship between the mind and its ideas, e.g. by appe~ to myserious forces called 'faculties'. Herbart reverses this orderof appreach. He resolutely dismisses the soul from the experienced world (from the realm of that \\hi.ch can be the subject~matter of our investigations). Instead ft is placed in effect-at the limit of the world, since its nature is totally unknown and forever remains so. Herbart starts, instead, with the ideas themselves: the soul• he says, has no power to call up, make, keep or recall an idea or to deduce one idea from another. All these matters the ideas arrange amongst themselves. . Here we see one possible germ of . Wittgenstein-'s claim that logical inference and eventually thought itself must take care of itself. (Cf. e.g.5.132). •see Klein, History of Scientific Psychology, Pt* 7to1777. ••-perhaps& see his 1884, p.iii. ... 25 E:ow the * ideas of each individual subject combine and interact, and how - ::".':C-3t importantly for Herbart, a thinker whose main direct contribution to the history of ideas has been in the field of pedagogical theoey•the ideas . ,. :. * .. -0? of a given subject change and develop through time, are matters to which we shall return only after we have discussed the general ontologicã (or metaphya- .,..cal) tr*aJ1ew-.)rk wit~ which Herbart was working. Herbart's ontology may most correctly be .desigr..~ted. as an atomistic realism. The world consists of a pluralit:~ of absolutely simple a.toms (which Herbart calls Real.en).. His argument for the existence of such simples as far. as I can understand it seems to rest on an appeal to the Aristotelean identity .theory of the predicate (a theory which, we rn'.tst remember, was almost mri.versally held, in one or other form, by logicians up to t:he time of Frege). According to this theory the 'is' in 'S is p' is an 'is' of identity. If we interpret this view in what seems, for our present purp~ses, to be th0 ~ost intuitively acceptable way, then we may say that 'S is p' is to be re-expressed~ in canonical form, as: 'Some part (or accident) of S is identical. with p'. 'Socrates is red', for example, expresses the identity some part of ~r;socrat'-* .e wi.th ( some individual accident) red. Now, Herbart argues, what is -•real', the ultimate furniture of the universe, c_annot have a multiplicity of determinations, for let us suppose that S denotes such a rea1, and that S has the different deterrninations a, b, c; i . e.,in canonica..?form1part of S, say s1, is identical. with a, another part of S, say s2 , is identical with b, and a third part, s 3 , with c. Now suppose s1, s2 and s3 are non-id~nticaJ..parts of s •. From this it follows that S can be decomposed into a number of different parts; but then these parts are more ultimate, ontologically speaking, than S, which con26 rra .:iicts our hypothesis. Hence s1, s2 and a3 are all identical to each other. _... ... ~ then since s 1 =a, s b s c it f 11 that b d id ti al 2 _= ' 3 = , o ows a, , an c are en c , which contradicts the hypothesis that S enjoyed a number of distinct determinations. Hence by reductio ~ absurdum we must conclude that what is real is • ~b~olutely simple. How, then, does it come aboutthat we are presented, in our experience, with .. objects having a multiplicity of attributes7 According to Herbart all attributes are a consequence of combinations among reals. (Compare Wittgenstein at 200231: [die] materielle Eigenschaften ••• werden.;;.erstdurch die Konfiguration der Gegen- .,,. stMnde-gebildet•.) "' To see a real S as !!~' corresponds, according to Herbart, to exi)er:iend.ng*S in combination with a series of fUrther reals, say, s1-,s.2 ,s3• •• • it To see S as ~to experiencing/in combination with a different aeries, say 8 1 •, 8 2 1 , s 3 • •••• That it is the ~ object S which is seen as both hard and real is a consequence of the fact that this is a common element in both series, as the centre of a circle is the common element in every radius. ~eibniz, it seems,employed a different version of the identity theory of the predicate, and it seems plausible that the diffe~ences between his monadological atomism and Herb~B ~-theory (discussed below) turn on differences in the-two versions of Aristotle's theory. An open problem, which X leave to minds capable of more intricate thought-connections than my own, is the following: that Wittgenatein 1 s Tractarian atomism stands to the Fregean function-argument theory of the predicate,as Herbart's and Leibniz's atomisms stand to their respective versions of the Aristotelean identity theory. ••Material properties are only produced by the configuration of (absolutely simple] objects. -- - - -- .... -~-27 Thus the intuitive conception, according to which the several attributes 'possessed by' an object share a single locus, ia overturned; instead we have to recognise that every attribute (individual accident) possesses a plurality of (absolutely simple) loci or, more precisely, that wherever there is the appearance of an attribute there is in truth a plurality of reals. The first and most obvious application of this theory is to the problem of ... change in objects through time. In fact we can construct a reductio argument exactly parallel to the above which would show that if 'S is a• is true at time t 1, •sis b' at time t 2 and Sis an ultimate real, then a and bare identical, *from which it follows that there can be no change in reals over time. What we conceive as a change in S from being a to being b is, in fact, a change in the stock of reals which are in combination with S at different times. As Wittgenstein put it: Der Gegenstand ist das Feste, Bestehende; die Konfiguration 1st clas Wechselnde, Unbestttndige. (2.0271)• And from this it seems obvious that the Herbartian appeal to a kind of 'linear combination' among reals has much in common with Wittgenstein's account in the Tractatus of Sachverhalt-configuration of simple objects. •objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable. Cf. also 2.021: Objects make up the substance of the world •. That is why they cannot be composite. 2.027: Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same. The* kernel of W~ttgeneteill'l!l _rlew_af_::.''9~9-' ccmflgurationis effectively a MO<ii t~ed version of Frege's theory of saturated and unsaturated entities. \'i~.* e :~c for Frege saturated* objects are conceived as 'cam_p]:etin ~unsaturated i:Llllctions to yield saturated collapsed statal entities (truth values: see my !_, pc9), for Wittgenstein it is the absolutely simple objects themselves which are t~nni,_turated (or perhaps we should say ~-unsaturated), and such objects where -~hey are of such a form that they 'fit into each other', perhaps in the way in ... which Aristotelean individual accidents fit into each other, combine to yield •• r;:; saturated states of affairso (Cf. Allaire, 1963). ~ote, in passing, that for Wittgenstein thus to treat objects very much as Frege had treated concepts would not have been, eog. terminologically, a great leap: Moore in "The Nature of Judgment" had treated concepts and objects as in effect identical; for Russell in the E!:!nciples (1903) both concept and object belonged to the same ontological category of items or terms. Further Meinong•s Gegenstandstheorie included concepts within its orbit, and concepts were included by Reinach in the cate~ory õ objects. Indeed,since Reinach and Wittgenstein both share the same dualistic ontology of objects on the one hand and statal entities (~- on the other, verhalte and Tatsachen)/we might expect to gain ~ome useful insight into the meaning which is acquired by the German word 'Gegenstand' when it is brought within this kind of dualist framework by comparing the "tables of entities" ad~ mitted,respectively,by Wittgenstein and Reinacha- •Cf. the discussion of the meaning of 'Satz' in § 1 above. ••I hope to be able to provide a fuller account of what thistfitting together' c*ould be in a later version of this paper, appealing first of all to Stumpf' s theory of dependent and independent parts and to the whole-part theory* .presented in Husserl\s IIIrd Logical Investigation, especially as this has been developed by the German logician Wolfgang Degen. *. WITTGENSTEIN: Objects (all simple) [Gegenst~de] Statal entities [ Sachverha1te and Tatsachen J ... REINACH: (see his 19~1; esp.p.82) I Some or a11 of: Objects (actual, possible & impossible) [ Gegenst!lnde ] .• Statal entities [sachverbalte] spatio-temporal simples tones colour(-flecks?) points point-instants thought-units Satzelemente = einfache Zeichen1= names? ••• Sachverha1te (all simple) : contingently obtaining and*nori-obtaining Tatsachen ( typicall~r non**simple) all actual: incl1.1ding: pictilres thoughts propositions sentences n4)D-pictorial facts (facts not actualised as pictures)" * ~tic-temporal . op~eot!L.(simple . * *and~ compo\ind) tones colours points point-instants thoughts and thought-units (lower and higher-order Vorstellungen) --concepts sentences mental acts events nlimbers ••• contingently obtaining states " nonn 11 analyt~cally 11 11 II non- " " asimilar 2-category diagram could be constructed also for Meinong (Objekte and Objektive). Cf. Babb.el, 1960.] We can now proceed to the comparison of Wittgenstein's account of the simple configuration of the Sachverhalt with Herbart's conception of serial com30 ,. :;..:nbin.ation: what is the model which underlies Herbart's theory, which would corr:~spond to the Wittgensteinian metaphors of chain-linkages (2.03) and satur- .;:~ion? We must remember that Herbart conceives the reals themselves after the r-attern of geometrical points (not e.g. machine parts fitting into each other). Thus there can be no question that their combination can involve any ineinander ' ~g~ a la Tractatus. Herbart's account of the 'combination' of reals involves rather an appeal to the notion, given currency by the physics of Newton, of .. action at a distance. In fact we are treated to a description of the relationship between the reals as resting on a kind of quasi-gravitational or quasimagnetic attraction and repulsion. In virtue of the existence of what might be conceived as a 'field of force' amongst the reals, certain ,combinations or 1 alliances 1 are formed between compatible reals, against the repelling forces of other, incompatible reals.• That this ld.nd of 'mechanical union' exists amongst reals is almost all that can be said within the strictly ontological sphere of Herbart's philosophy. We can go further., to provide, in particular, an explanation of how an objective material world arises, only when we move from the province of ontology to • I am not adequate to the task of distinguishing""what might be, from the modern point of view, the philosophical working parts in such accounts. It seems lamentable that Harbart scholarship has waned to the extent that it has, and this is almost certainly the result of a historiographical simplification that '19th century German philosophy' = 'Hegelian idealism' introduced originally merely for pedagogical purposes. (Compare the account of British philõophy as 'Locke, Berkeley, Hume• at the expense of e.g. Reid, Brown, and Hamilton). Perhaps the mo5t that I can hope for, from* the present remarks,is not that they should throw any significant light on Wittgenstein's thought, but that they may rather generate some modicum of interest in Herbart. We should thus be using the Tractatus ., as a doorway not, indeed, out of but back into a perhaps over-hastily discredited tradition. A comparison of Herbart's thought with that of Bolzano, for example, is urgently required if we are fully to understand either philosopher. - - ---- --- -* *-- *-- - . -- -- .. -** ... 31 that of psychology, for it is in virtue of mental activity alone that such a world can be said to exist~ The crucial problem, then, is this: how are reals, in combination, presented to us in the ways in which they are so presenteli? And here too it is exclusively in terms of specific kinds of machañ:;.' combination that the existence of ideas or 'presentations• is to be explained. Far - - *- --*- - . - - - . - . ..... - - ------ -------------according:.* to Herbart the soul itself is an absolutely simple real, and it is the relations in which to stands to other reals (der sich zueinander in •• bestimmten Weisen Verhalten) which give rise to our conscious and unconscious experience. Once again we shall find it useful to present Wittgenstein's account of such experience before moving on to give a: *. ::. summary of the Herbartian theoey. For Wittgenstein, as for Herbart, we have to distinguish between the*'mezital content (thought) and the object-combination which is presented (pictured) in that content. Now since eveey thought is itself, for Wittgenstein, a combination of simple elements (in virtue of its linguistic articulation), it becomes possible for him to conceive the relation between these two entities as one of isomorphism, as resting on some complex kind of .ismD:orphic *ina.pping of one .canfiguration: . of absolute simples onto the other"~ '*.::: . . As we shall r . - -see, this account rests, in the end, on Wittgenetein 1 e . mS:jO!" . aehievement~--, .. *The experienced world or 'objective semblance' is thus, in the terminology of Ingarden (1964/65; cf. also Smith,~), a higher-order intentional object founded upon the autonomous totality of reals. ••I have not yet discovered examples of this mode of expression in Herbart's writings, but it does occur, for example in Lotze. 32 -~ ... his theory of logical operations.!* Wittgenstein divides configurations, first of ~.:, into simple and complex. To simple configurations (~hverha1te) we shall l':M.ve to return below, but suffice it here to say (i) that we have a determinate method for establishing isomorphism of two simple configurations effectively by drawin3 lines connecting the elements of one with the elements of the other, and (:ii) that we are to conceive it as being possible to develop a (Principiastyle, identity-fr~e) world-mirroring, formal language whose atomic formulae • would themselves be simple configurationso The nature of complex .configurations (Tatsache) Wittgenstein now explains as follows: atomic formu1ae can be compounded together, by means of logical operations, to yield complex formulae. Thus we shall be able to provide an account of the isomorphism (picturing relationship) between complex propositions and complex configurations (facts),(and thereafter also of the isomorphisms between thoughts and propositions and between thoughts and facts, between sentences (Satzzeichen) and propositions and between sentences and facts, and so on),if we can generalise the notionsof logical operation and logical compounding to apply not merely to linguistic formulae but to simple configurations in general. That such a generalisation is indeed possible is shown by demonstrating (i)that the application of '1ogical operations''to simple configurations can be shown to involve an appeal simply'*to the totality .Nowhere in the Tractatus does Wittgenstein state that atom~c formulae (Elementarstttze) are Sachverhalte as is assumed here in the text. He does however seem to be committed to the weaker statement that such formulae can be put into isomorphism with Sachverhalte, which will prove sufficient for our purp~.ses. ••The theory of logical operations was not, of course, original with Wittgenstein: see item 'Operation' in Appendix II; what ~ origina1 was the underlying extensionalism, with its consequences e.g. iij. the &las* of probabili_ty theory, ethics, philosophy of religion, etc. ------ - - --- ----* - - --- - - ------ *- - - ------ --of all possible combinations of the results of applying the functors das Bestehen von and das Nichtbestehen von to the totality of Sachverbalte, and (ii) that these functors have in turn a satisfactory intuitive meaning within the framework of our ontology, corresponding, respectively to the existence of the simple configuration in question, and to the noñexistence of that configilration. Thus we obtain the units, the ... 'logical' combination of which yields the whole of the 2nd tier of 9rganisation. It is this two-tier structure of simple and complex configurations (~verhalte and ~atsachen) which makes it possible for Wit~genstein to give an account, in the Tractatus, of the 'higher mental processes' .. (that is to say, an account of the logical order of our thinking activity) which explains, at the same time, how even highly compound thoughts can preserve a relationship to the underlying cembinations of element~y objects. Herbart, too, defends such a twotier structure, • but in a way . whi.:Oh provides us wit~: n6 adequate theory - - -* - . - . of the(logic~)order of our thoughts; indeed for almost 100 years after Herbart's Psychologie,experimental psychologists were unable to account, within t.\-.e.\r theories, for mental activity more complex than ~ensation, rote memory, and logical simple associative thought; until the/double-tier approach was introduced (by Meinong and Husserland by Selz, to whom we shall turn below) only a few years before the publication of the Tractatus. We must now attempt to assemble together the details of Herbart's theory of presentation that we may achieve thereby an adequate estimation of his philos- *This is discussed briefly in the section which follows. or '.ico.l importance. The soul is, we ~aid, an absolutely simple *real. However, i..rt v:~'...rtue of its manifold connections with other reals it becomes possible t~ conceive it as being itself subject to a manifold of temporally changing determinations, called 'ideas' or 'presentations'. We might say that what is ';1::*,,,.c *:;~q;;erienced "16 mi'1.ifold1when the soul is conceived in its relation to other reals,has to be viewed as a ~gle absolutely simple, eternal (or better: timeless) act-as~ .f!g swoop when the soul is conceived in abstraction from such relations. We shall shortly be able to dispense with this latter mode of conception of the soul, since, as Herbart quite rightly points out, the soul as a real is absolutely inaccessible to our experiences,which are confined exclusively to the objective semblance. ~ut we should first of all indicate the* crucial role in Herbart's theory which is played by the assmnption of the absolutely simple soul-real in manifold combination with other, external reals. For it becomes hereby possible simultaneously to provide a solution to two crucial problems which had bedevilled the British empirical psychologists, particularly Hume, to whom Herbart is otherwise in so many respects related~ These were (i) to accou..'1.t for the unity of the mind (of the sequencesof impressions and ideas~amongst which we can dis~over no* unifying term which we could label as the 'self'), and (ii) to account for the 'contact' btltween*:each individual soul and the surrounding world, ilicluding other individuals. The unity of the mind is accounted for, of course, by the fact that what, from one point of view, appears as manifold is, in reality, absolutely (J.ne and simple. And.*'contact' likewise is accounted for by the fact,that given the presentation of sanething which is manifold,this can only be in virtue of the existence of combinations with other reals; thus the very fact of experience leads ... \ .,., .. 35 analytically, within Herbart's theory, to the assumption of plurality. Solipsism is, as we shal.l see, absolutely impossible for the Herbartian. It is by now clear that for Herbart there ia, .in the world of appearance, no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas (cf. 5.631-641). In this sense therefore the Herbartian subject,along with all other reals, lies at the limit of the world,where its nature is and forever remains totally un- ... known. What there is in the world (in the objective semblance) is mental experience and the material world which is presented thereby. Intuitively we are to think of each and every experience as resting on the attraction and repulsion of vast numbers of reals in contact with the soul-real, the vast number of ideas thereby generated forming series which interweave, both amongst themselves and amongst other idea-groups previoμsly established in the mind, these latter groups enabling us to make sense of the newly introduced ideas, yielding associative mem01"'experiences, etc. What now is the nature of the connection which exists between the ideas or presentations generated in this way? Presentations may, first of all, be ,. exactly alike: as two successive ideas of an identfcal red. In such cases the two ideas fuse or coalesce into one single idea. They may, seoondly, be ideas entirely contrary: as an idea of red and an idea of green. If two such/ atta:npt immediate to establish themselves in the mind at a single instant there is an/ tendency for them to exclude or inhibit* each other. Finally we have . the (typical) case where ideas are disparate but compatible: for example an idea of green and an idea of hard. In these cases the ideas form combinations or complexes . 36 ln investigating those ideas which may thus 'complicate' with each other ;o form complexes, Herbart arrives at the notion of a qualitative continuum; for example~the continua of colours, of tastes, of sounds, of hardnesses, and so on. Two elements from the same qualitative continuum can combine --0nly arrest' pa...~ially, in a Dl8ll.Il~J'.' __ :which involves what Herbart calls'f'usion -~th/. Elements from different qualitative continua can, given appropriate environing conditions, .. unite in a single time-instant to form a complex, for example the complex of ideas which is my present perception of this coloured, moving fleck before me. Typically our experience consists of many interweaving series of ideas, complicated together (i.e. forming complexes, the elements of which belong to different qualitative continua) and interrelating in a variety of different ways. (Cf. Stout, 1888, p. 20 and e.g. the remark on p.13: According to Herbart, every sen:a.tion, however simple it may appear, is due to the fusion of innumerable homogeneous components, which are given suocessi:rely in the minute di.visions of time during which the external stiinulus operates). However, Herbart's most important contribution to our contemporary mode of thought rests not on his accounts of the ordering of such mental activity..-nor indeed on his account of the relationship between 'inneri and 'outer' (mental and material) combination among reals,to which we shall have to turn below. It rests, rather, upon his use of mathematics in the study of the m::l.nd, in particular of the differential calculus(which deals, of course*, with variations which are continuous). Herbart provided, indeed, the philosophical tools for mathematical baulked the/solution of a problem which had hitherto/philosophers and mathematicians alike: how is it possible that, in a world consisting of discrete elements 37 which were, in Herbart's case , *absolutely simple, immutable rea1s ,the * appearance of continuous variation may arise (in space,time and _ * in each of the qualitative continua distinguished by Herbart)? Herbart in fact developed an elaborate theory of continua as intellectual fictions ~ ~ the objective semblance and corresponding only indirectly to determinations in the real world. Thus the two spheres (the objective semblance and the .. world of rea1s) have different mathematical structures. Given Herbart's work in this field, together with the constant stress in his writings on the concepts of 1manifoldS•, 'spaces•, 'dimensions', •orders•, one is tempted to make out a case for ascribing to Herbart (and his followers throughout central Europe) a quite unique role in determining the intellectual conditions which made possible, for example, non-Euclidean geometry, Einstein's relativity theory, Ma.chian sensationalism, perhaps even Freud's tripartite theory of the • d • min • Finally we must sketch, briefly, some aspects of the account which Herbart supplies of the 'presenting' relation between series and complexes of ideas 4 on the one hand and objects in the world of appearance on the other. The ultimately determinations on each side/rest, as we have seen, on combinations of reals, •The most influential and the most distinguished agent in all of this was certainly the mathematician li.emann, a devoted follower of .Herbart, who ascribes to his philosophical mentor an essential role in his invention of the general theory of (discrete and continuous) manifolds, the theory.which lies at the - ----core of Ce.g.) relatirlty physics.(See the introductory par~graphs*of Riemann's 1854, and the discussion in my 1976, § 13) o Note that although Herbart almost certainly acquired the term 'Mannigfaltigkeit' from Kant, the theory which he presented was original with him: Kant's theory of manifolds excludes the possibility of mathematical treatment. 3-8 Y12t we may rightly demand, in a philosophically adequate account of-•ntal: expe~- .---* 1e:1ca, something more than a merely mechanical account of interrelatiQDs;among ".;/:l.e -rea1s • The crucial additional factor which Herbart supplies is a recognition of the fact that each presentation can be conceived from two points of view: either (i) as activity, the presentation as subjected to mechanical ~nt~~~~tion w:i.+,h other presentations, or (ii) in abstraction from its rela- *tions with other presentations. Under the first aspect the presentation is something which b~longs to the subject matter of empirical psychology (a species of IT.echa.nics, for Herbart): e.nd from this point of view presentations may 1 conf1.ict•, may 'coalesce' and so on. Under the second aspect, however, the presentation or •concept' belongs to the subject-matter of logic; for from this aspect we are interested exclusively in the content of the idea, and not in any contingent situations in which it may have come to be actualised. From this point of view presentations or concepts are 'contrary', •equivalent•, •complementary•, etc.• Unfortunately we are not yet able to carry this forward in such a way as to provide a complete ~ccount of the Herbartian theory of presentation. Insteã we wish to sketch some of the relations between Herbart and Leibniz, relations which may prove more immediately relevant in a Tractarian context. As we shall see, a comparison between Herbart's atomism and Leibniz's monadology•• ;yields an initial temptation to conceive Wittgenstein as through and through a Herbartian thinker. For Leibnizian monads are absolutely incapable of foming .... , ... •O O P L- combinations: the monads are windowless. And secondly we are to imagine each monad as having been 'set going• (like a clock, in pre-established synchrony with all other clocks), and as thereafter being cognitively active: the monad is a subject which thinks. In all of these respects Herbart puts *forward •A complete version of these notes would need to . iñ~udo a discussion of Herbart's activity/content opposition as this affected both Husserl (in his 1891 and 1900/01) and, through Herbart's theory of number Frege: cf. 1884,p.iii. ••A comparison which is to be found frequently in the literature of 19th century Austrian philosophy. 39 an*. opposing view to that of Leibniz, one which seems, at each point, to draw him closer to the Tractatus. Thus Herbart's reals are capable of linearly combining with each other, and it is such linear combination alone which yields all materia1 determination and all change (all •sosein und Geschehen•, 6.41) and which constitutmthe world as we experience it (the . - **- ---_Objective semblance). ]\\rther Herbart's soul is not a subject which thinks: like every other real it lies beyond the limits of the world of appearance in which w~ (apparently) live and think. Its exclusive function (as a hypothetical entity, within the theory) is to guarantee the unity which characterises the mental experiences of a given subject by serving ã the common term in all of the serial combinations which constitute those mental experiences. We can bring out the parallels between Herbart's and Wittgenstein's ontologies by means of the following diagram: WITTGENSTEIN HERBART totalities of Gedanken of each subject (picturing facts) _ _J__.i--------=7'-,~~----+.-J._:totalities of combinations of reals yielding lt......::..-+-11.l::'resentati"ons (~or each totality of all facts: the world totality of pictured facts (simple) objects together forming the •substance• of the world individual SUbJeCt) totality of all combinations of reals the objective ~-t--+-semblance reals together forming the (real) world 40 :*.11 of wli..ich suggests that the I official I ontology of the Tractatus (that wrr'..~h is expressed in _the course of paragraphs 1 to, say, 5.32) should be ' l assifi ed as essentially Herbartian in nature. But there is a second •unofficial' ~ntology in the Tractatus, which can be gleaned from certain passages scattered through the paragraphs which remain: this is the ontology of solipsism. Something i'urther which is first developed by Wittgenstein in these paragraph& is the concept of language the logically adequate (formal"?) language referred to aboveas a mirror of the world. This is a concept which same hfJ.S highly pre-Kantian roots, and when we discover that the flnirroring relation is also applied by Wittgenstein to his ('unofficial') accoUn.t of the relationship between the ~' or microcosm, and the world, then it lies close at hand to seek an interpretation of this second ontology within a Leibnizian . . framework. For we shall remember that Leibniz's monads, though windowless, yet mirror~ universe , each from its own particular perspective. Thus we might say that within the official ontology it is the totalit;y; of facts which is taken as primary, that language is seen as ontologically derivative in relation to that totality*, and that finally the individual .totalities of thoughts are in turn derivative of language, since it is exclusivelyin virtue of their linguistic (logical) articulation that they acquire their status as thoughts at all (and not, e.g., in Virtue of their satisfying •Language is'derivative'in the sense that linguistic entities are all of them seen as being primarily particular facts, and or.ly secondarily* as being characterisable ~~linguistic". Note the extent to which language is conceived ontologically by Wittgenstein (e.g. at 4.001). 41 some psychological criterion). In the unofficial ontology,in contrast, it is !!!l thoughts ~ which are ontologically primary. However, in consequence of my understanding of a world-mirroring language (5.62),the world and all its objects are recovered but they have an ontologically 'weaker' status; in the terminology of Ingarden they are merely intentional correlates of my linguistic acts. (See §§ 50-53 ... of my 1976). Thus the diagrammatic representation of the unofficia1 ontology is, as we should expect, identical with that of the official ontology except that now different regions have acquired different ontological * weights: in particular one specific thought-totality is picked out as enjoying a privileged ontological status in relation to the remaining thought-totalities and indeed to the totality of all remaining facts • . But all of this throws what is,admittedly, 'Tery little light on the claim that in the unofficial ontology :it is my thoughts alone which are ontologically primary. We might come margir..ally closer to an understanding of this claim if we investigate the role which is played by the underlying atoms/monads in the two ontologies which *..;e have distill"guished-.We remember that in the Herbartian ontology it becomes possible to distinguish individual mental exper- . iences of the soul only when the latter is conceived in the light of its combinations with other reals outside it. Only in the context of such combinations does the soul 'have presentations' at all, for conceived in isolation it is an absolutely simple entity. Solipsism the view that the individual soul alone exists is thereby absolute:!..y excluded within the Herbartian framework, for in the absence of other reals it becomes meaningless to ascribe to the soul any ~lffe~ at alll pluralism is built into the very foundations of Herbart's thought. ~h.e~ ~e enter the Leibnizian framework, in contrast, we feel almost obligated, gtven the existence of a single self-contained, windowless, world-mirroring monad, ~o .*egard anything outside the self thus isolated as ontological notsam. The *orld thereby shrinks to a point without extension, leaving the reality, coordinated * o:V~ '". the totality of experiences of the self ,(of course) unchanged. ... __ ----* -****------ -'• j~ ~here have been recent attempts in the literature (see e.g. Bartley, 1974, in ~articular as aids to the widerstanding of Wittgensteiñs philosophical development. It therefore seems incumbent upon us that we turn our attention brief1.y to this aspect of Herbart's thought. We must note, first of a11, the extent to which one-sided and over-simplistic preconceptions have coloured the estimation of Herbart in very many spheres. Thus when psychologists have turned to Herbart they have sought to extract his 1properly psychological' thought from whã they regard as alien metaphysics, and the picture which thereby results is often one of Herbart merely as an associationistic thinker. We have seen, however, thãit is precisely the juxtaposition of metaphysical (better: ontological) aspects (atoms, in combination, yielding an objective world of determination and change) with psychological aspects (atoms, in combination, yielding perceptions of objects in VJ:ry that objective wor~d) which lends his thought its interest. For thiS/JUXta- • position of ontology and psychology came to characterise so much of sub- •or the related juxtaposition of ontology and logico-semantics (401121) .. sequent 'Austrian' philosophy (see e.g. Meinong, ed. 19o4 ". and Findlay, 1963,p.7). * It is precisely such a one-sided, psychological picture of Herbart to which appeal is made by Bartley when he puts forward an account of the development of Wittgenstein's thought ••• as that of an amateur child p.s;,*::hol.:.igist tm'ning partly as a result of his experience in ~cnc~lt~~~h:L.~g from an essentially associationist psychology to a con- .figuraticri.ism or contextualisrr: close to that of the Gestaltists. (1974a, p;309). Before turning to correct the picture of Herbart in all of this when ~e shall find that there is a case to be made for regarding Herbart himself as ~ving defended a 'configurationism or contextualism close to that of the Gestaltists' it will be well if we indicate two fUrther , independent simplifications, the correction of each of which does something to undermine Bartley's surely baseless* conception of a sudden break in Wittgenstein's thirJdng. There is, first of all, no evidence of anyinterest in child psychology on Wittgenstein's part before the publication of the Tractatus. There is however ample evidence of an interest in theoretical psychology during this period, (indeed, I hope to show in a fUture paper that already within the Tractatus we can discern certain core ideas of Gestalt psychology-at least in the embryo form in which this had been anticipated by Ehrenfels, acknowledged father of the discipline, in his 1890). And secondly, a key role is assigned by Bartley to the psychologist Karl Btthler, whose theories ~e related to those of the Austrian .3chool reform movement (in which Wittgenstein was peripherally to involved)on the one hand and/Wittgenstein's later, 'contextualist.' :philosophy on the other. Because of his preconcoption.of a radical change in Wittgenstein's \-lilou..g.r.*.~. , however, Bartley fails to draw certain important conclusions from the ~ c~ .,;, >at already before the war BUhler had done important work in the study of .;.;:* * -::;eless thought 1 , work which served as a foundation for his later theorising :!.n the field of child psychology. (Cf. Bartley, 1974,p.105). ~ - * - ------- - ~/u.:.. *iilg the first d.::cade of this century BUhler had been a leading member of ;; '1e :i.nfiuential WUrzburg school of experimental psychology, and as such he had spr1n1g to fame amongst experimental psychologists through the controversy in which he had engaged with Wundt,.after the latter had savagely criticised the Wttrzburg experimental methods(which rested crucially on a rigorous process of intrõpection). Along with August MesseriBUhler had done much .to improve the philosophical foundations of WUrzburgian psychology by :ilnporting concepts derived from the work of Edmund Husserl, especially from the latter's Logical Invest:gations. (As with G. Husserl's account of legal facts discus~ed above and with Reinach's Sachverhalt ontology~scussed in.! and~ so here we can discern important parallels between the work of BUhler and .the Tractatus. Parallels of this sort can be accounted for, it seems, only on the basis of a recognition of the extent to which the latter is a work enjoying manifold relations to the Meinong-Husserl-Stumpf philoso;hical ontology.) . Anticipations of Tractarian ideas in the works of the WUrzburg school (discussed in § 8 below) have a quite specific philosophical relevance since if it can be *shown in detai~: . that it is possible to read the Tractatus against ~ background the background of KUlpe, Marbe, Messer, the early Btthler and (especially) Selz-then it becomes point of view, clear that,at least from one/ the account of thinking which is inherent in it is by no means so inadequate as has subsequently been supposed not .least by Wittgenstein himself o First of all, however, we must return to Herbart• According to Bartley, Herbart's theory of the mind is a 'bucket or tub theory' (1974a, p.309). Thus whilst recognising that Herbartian ideas may themselves be active, he claims that they lead their lives in passive storehouse minds. To a Herbartian, whose aim above all is moral education, teaching consists in feeding students those ideas which it has been decided should dominate their lives. (~.cit.) He goes oñto stress the emphasis on rote-learning, on discipline, on nonoriginative teaching and strict adherence to 'method books-' in Habsburg educational practice. It is not clear to me the extent to which this account involves a running together of Herbartian theory with the Austrian ~ Policy of which the theory was employed as an instrument.* Suffice it to say,in defence of Herbart, that from the pedagogical point of view the schools of Austria were, as Bartley himself admits, the envy of Europe. What is more important is that we should examine Bartley's account of the Herbartian conception of the mind, for here it is clear that talk of 'passive storehouses' is quite inappropriate. For whilst the mind (the totality of ideas or presentations) within the Herbartian framework is indeed 'passive' ~ from one point of view, yet, in virtue of the activity of the ideas themselves it comes to enjoy a highly complex organisation, and Herbart's accounts of this organisation are often reminiscent of Freud who may, indeed, have been influenced by them. Moreover this complex organisation yields an analogue of self-determination and self-will in the developed mind (discussed by Stout, 1888, pp.4350) 9 --the •storehouse' is not therefore 'passive•. •Thus one of the consequences of Herbartian theory is that rote-learning should actually be abandoned, in favour of techniques of learning by assoc46 .\11 ideas arise , we saw , in virtue of combinations of reals (comand * -i,r:,a tions, in fact, of * external/ bodily reals with the soul) • The ideas ~.ttract and repulse each other, coalescing or forming complexes or inhibiting each other according to the extent to which their natures SD! alien or compat- .u . :.Le. It is this generative and inhibitive activity which constitutes the stre8m of mental experiences with which we are all of: us familiar. Herbart ... now demonstrates how, in virtue of the -' mutual conflict of incompatible ideas, comes to be the idea-totality of a given subject / divided into two sub-totalities, those of which we are conscious and those which are, at any given time, below the 'threshold' of consciousness. Ideas can securely cross this threshold, in effect, only to the extent that they can form alliances with other ideas, already present in consciousness,(from which we can draw certain immediate pedagogical consequences; for example that the teacher should offer new idea-material to the pupil only when this new material has been somehow made accessible to the latter through chains of compatible ideas concluding in ideas with which he is already familiar.) How, now, do these remarks relate to Wittgenstein? ~~ was stated above (p.31) that Herbart, like Wittgenstein, had developed a two-tier account of the combination of reals (combination which yields the mental experience of each subject on the one hand, and the objective semblance on the other). So far we have discussed only simple ('linear') combination within the Herbartian framework, and we have seen something of how such linear canbinations give rise to aerial orderings (e.g. of space and time). At this point 47 - *-* ... . . *. however we must proceed to give an account of the second tier of •combination•, a type of higher-order bonding-together which comes into being exclusively within the mental sphere. Indeed its function within Herbart's theory is precisely to explain the order in that sphere, without appeal to any subject which thinks, nor te any mythological faculties of reason or 1.mderstanding • ... In the Tractatus, of course, this order is explained also by appeal to a second tier of combination, yielding the space of Tatsachen,the logical order of which characterises also each sub-space of mental Tatsachen or thoughts, as well as the sub-space of linguistic Tatsachen. We might therefore anticipate that, just as the lower type of combination in Herbart corresponds to Sachverhalt configuration in the Tractatus, so also Herbart's higher type of mental combination might correspond to something recognisable as Wittgensteinian Tatsachen. We find however that logically complex judgments are conceived, by Herbart, in terms of just the same kind of attractive combination amongst ideas which accounts for mental experiences of simpler types. A radically new kind of organisation amongst mental entities is encountered, iri ... fact, only when we move up to a much higher level, to a level which corresponds in Wittgensteinian terms not to individual thoughts but to complete forms of life. A conception of the mind as a contourless 'bucket or tub' , into which enter myriad series of reals. (resulting, e.g. from sense-perception or from physiological disturbances) seems to preclude an answer to ~he question: how is disciplined thought possible? It seems that mental experience would be 48 e,o.D .i':!.ned exclusively to sensual and emotional elements accompanied, at most, h ::. kind of inner babbling, resulting from what Herbart ca11a 'the un- (10ntrolled play of the psychological mechanism• and which, as Stout reports, '-ls to be found in the most striking form in children and uneducated persons• • v*iov0, p.32).. If ordered thought is to be possible ,then there must be certain connections amongst some of the ideas or presentations in the mind corresponding, on the levei of content, to (e.g.) logical connections which are not subject to transient disturbances by the entry of new ideas, but* which rather serve as a conceptual network in terms of which those new ideas, deriving, eog., from sensory experience, acquire their meaning for the subject in question. The totalities of ideas connected together in this way Herbart called presenti\,tign-massea. As Stout expressed it: The uncontrolled play of the psychological mechanism gives place to disciplined thinking, in so far as presentation-masses come into being which are reinstated and maintained in consciousness without lasting or important modification from extraneous conditions, because their mode of reproduction is determined mainly and ultimately by the internal connexion of their components • ( 1888, p.32). such presentationor idea-masses arise when,through long association with a large number of similar ideas (ideas which have a tendency to fuse together and thereby to attract further, related ideas to a slowly growing whole) a large number of complex interweaving* connections is established which bind together, in.: a variety of mutually supporting ways, a complete and relatively self-sufficient idea-fabric. It is the presence of such presentation-masses in the miri.d which determines, for example, the ideas which shcill be inhibited at the threshold of consciousness. And it is the individual presentationmass which determines, to a large extent, the combinations of new ideas which enter the mind, and therefore also the aspects in which the objects presented by those ideas are given. Thus one and the same object will be perceived differently by subjects with different presentation-masses, since ideas of those objects will enter each mind in such a way as to fit into quite differently structured surrounding contexts of compatible ideas. And what applies to the perception of objects applies also to the imderstandmg of language and to the gra9ping of concepts. A Worcestershire peasant, a Yarmouth fisherman, a * London policeman, a West-end gourmet, a member of the Fishery board, an evolutionist philosopher, and a primary school boy have all concepts of crab; . but could these concepts be actualised• the *results would be startlingly unalike ••• How then are we to know what a crab is, how decide which of these queer concepts is legitimately entitled to the name it claims~ (Adams, 1897, P• 182) As Frege, or Wittgenstein might have put it: Only in the nexus of a presentation-mass does a name have meaning. Indeed context-principles of this form occur quite frequently in the writings of .Herbart's followers (see, e.g. Adams, 1897, p.180) and perhaps also the contextualism of the Viennese philosopher Wilhelm Jerusalem (see Appendix III, below) may have to be understood i~ this light. (We may mention also the contextua1ist writings of w. Schapp, see e.g. his 1953 and Schmidt, 1967). 0 This is not to suggest however that there is typically only one presentation mass executing its organisatory function in the developed human mind. Rather: In the course of a varied experience many distinct masses are formed connected with special localities and occupations, such as the church• the theatre, the office, the garden, the chess-board, and the like. (Stout, cn.cit.,p.33). 50 ~g. Between Meinong•s Grazer Schule,Ehrenfels, Husserl and Stumpf on b'he. cne hE.nd and the Gesta1t psychology proper of Wertheimer, Keb1er and Koffka there *arose a school of experimental psychologists -* * *: ~ -*:: s~. Southern Germany which exerted a wide influence on the thought of the period, not only in the German-speaking world but also in England and -*" ::liJ.*.. America {e'3pecially in Titchener's institute at Cornell). This was the Wtlrzburg school, fcu21d~d by Oswald Kttlpe, someone whom we have already met as a* correspondent of .. Alexander in Manchester. 'WUrzburg psychology was perhaps the most determined at-tempt to carry through in an'" experimenta1 way the Herbartian irogramnie . according to which it is the ideas of the mind which must form the direct subject-matter of tlie science of psychology. Before KUlpe experimenta1 psychologists had found a great deal of success in applying their accepted methods to perception, to and feelings and emotions, ,A;o simple association of ideas, but the higher mental processes,of thinld.ng, reasoning, judging, remembering, had not proved amenable to any standard , .. laboratory treatment. KUlpe and his followers developed, in the first decade of this century, a series of ingenious methods by means of which such higher mental processes could be brought within the scope of experimental investigation, but they were methods which caused a great deal of ~ controversy throughout the closely-knit world of experimental psychology because of their revolutionary and to those used to cruder associatiord.irtic techniques highly dubious character. In the first work of the WUrzburg group, published in 1901 by Mayer and Orth,the centra1 experiment was set up as follows: each of a small group of highly' trained, highly articulate subjects was given a stimulus word and asked to describe everything which occurr~d in his mind in response to .51 the word. Sometimes images occurred,(eogo to the word •cat' an image of some specific cat), sometimes acts of will occurred (e.g. in response to a stimulus word for some desir~ble object). Sometimes the subjects reported that images of words additional to the stimulus word were present in the mind. But it was discbvered also that a further group of contents Of consciousness were repeatedl1 * found to be present. Ã the experimenters themselves report: In the course of our experiments we were, again and again, involuntarily brought up against the fact of the existence of this third group. The subjec frequently reported that they experienced certain events of consciousness which they could quite clearly designate neither as definite images nor yet as volitions. For example, the subject Mayer made the observation that, in reference to the auditory stimulus-word "metre" a peculiar event of consciousness intervened which could not be characterized more exactly, and which was succeeded by the spoken response "trochee". In other cases, the subjects could give a closer account of these psychic facts. For example, Orth observed that the stimulus word "mustard" released such a peculiar event of consciousness, which he thought he could characterize as ''Memory of a common figure of speech". Thereafter the reaction "grain" (~) followed. In all such cases, the subject could, nevertheless, not detect the slightest trace of the presence in consciousness of "presentations" (Vorstellungen) by which they specified the psychic fact more exactly in their reports. All these events of consciousness, in spite of their obviously, often totally, different quality, we class together under the name Bewusstseinslagen states of consciousness. The replies of the observers show that these states of consciousness are sometimes marked by feeling, but are, however, sometimes without any feeling tone. (Mayer and Orth, 1901, po6).• Bewusstseinslagen, then, are imageless thoughts, sometimes with, sometimes without an attached feeling tone. The second major product of the WUrzburg school was by the psychologist Ko published Marbe, also/in 1901. It bore the title: Experimental Psychological Investigations •• of Judgment: An Introduction to Logic. Marbe set himself the task of finding out what it was which distinguished those mental acts which ~e acts of judgment •as trans. in Humphrey, 1951, p.33. ••Surely we can discern an implicit reference to works - ~nd titles such as this at Tractatus 40 1121 0 52 from mental, acts of other typeso (We might say that he was searching for the psychologic~l correlate of Frege's 'judgment stroke•). He therefore set his subjects various tasks, such as comparing different weights, determining the lightest of three greys, or simple arithmetical tasks, each resulting in the need to make a determinate judgment. The subjects were then instructed to report as precisely as possible everything which took place in their minds during the making of this judgment. Marbe's conclusion was rather unexpected: he concluded that there are absolutely no concomitant events of which it could be said that they lend to judgment its character. That is, that there are judgments, recognised on all sides as such, with nothing in consciousness to indicate why they are judgments. The results of these early papers were therefore, as KUlpe himself pointed out (1922, p.309), largely negative: they consisted in the discovery that the conventional descriptive terms of experimental psychology were not adequate to account for the higher intellectual processes.(See Humphrey, 1951, p.36). The next, by now more positive, product of the WUrzburg school appeared in 19o6 by Messer, a psychologist who played an important role as link man between Husserl's phenomenology and experimental psychology. Messer's 224 page paper is entitled''Experimental Investigations into the Psychology of Thought". His progranune consisted in developing thought-experiments of such a wide range that the supply of examples of Bewusstseinslagen thereby achieved would be sufficiently large and heterogeneous to make possible a classification (and eventually also a theory) of such states of consciousness, states which had hitherto been regarded as being not further analysable. Fourteen different sets of experiments were 53 conducted, including: supply a co-ordinate object to the stimulus-word (e.g. to the stimulus * 'hand' , the response ' foot' ) ; supply a coordinate idea ( e. g • stimulus •table', response 'furniture•); characterise the idea denoted by the stimulus (e.g. flood - 'a great mass of water in movement•); give a relation between (two) stimulus-words; express a personal preference between two famous men, things, states, etc.; given a noun and adjective, make a judgment including both; given a proposition, take up some attitude with respect to it; and so on. (See Humphrey, p.38 for a complete list). The first result of Messer's experiments was a confirmation of the original conclusion of Mayer and Orth, i.e. that there are very many psychic states which involve no images, which are not--except, perhaps, in retrospect verbalisable, and which yet play a determining role in the course of our thinking • . Thus Kttlpe, who served as a long-suffering subject for nearly all of the WUrzburg experiments, in g::l.ving to the stimulus-word 'horsefly' the response 'dragon-fly', could report that the superordinate idea •vermin' though not, be it noted, the~ was 1clearly present'as a Bewusstseinslage as the response was given. (Humphrey, po39). This possibility, that there are imageless meaning-elements corresponding to words which are present in the mind even in the absence of the words themselves, will have an important role to play in oursubsequent arguments concerning the Tractatus. Other Bewusstseinslagen distinguished by the WUrzburg group included the consciousness of a rule not the explicit thinking of the rule itself, but rather the awareness of the existence of the rule as something which one knows can be followed in giving circumstances and which thereby sanctions the passage in thought from one situation to another without any explicit reflection about the x*elation between the two situations. They included.also the consciousness that something is real, that it is lasting a long time, that it is over more quickly than expected, that it is the same as what came before, that it is compatible with some other thing, that it makes sense, that it is on the tip of the tongue, that it will be difficult, that we need not do it, that we are ready for it, that we can do it if we try, and so ono (See Findlay, 1955, p.184 quoting from Titchener~9o;v10,p.50~). What now, is the relevance of these investigations to our understanding of the T:;:-o.cto.tiiO'; O:uccag~i tl:i.1: read.er musi; be *satisfied with :Little more than hints, until the full philosophical consequences (if any) of the parallels set forth here and in ! have been assembled together. Let us recall, first of all, the letter which Russell wrote to Wittgenstein asking for a clarification of the nature of thoughts (Gedanken) in the Tractatus. Russell had asked Wittgenstein what were the constituents of the thought and what was their relation to the fact pictured by the thought. Wittgenstein's reply (1974, p.72) was as follows: I don't know what the constituents of a thought are but I know that it - must have such constituents which correspond to the words of Language. Again the kind of relation of the constituents *of thought and of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It would be a matter of psychology to find it out. And again: Does a Gedanke consist of words? No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know. (My emphasis,here and above). As Shwayder concludes (1954, P•77): Wittgenstein's 11Gedanken" are not other-worldly "senses" of sentences, but the significant sentences themselves. In addition ••• Wittgenstein certainly thinks that Thoughts are psychological complexes ••• (p.128:) [an] interpretation which will shock many readers and is in need of justification. • 55 Further justification adduced by Shwayder includes the discussions of psychology .• in the Notebooks (W~ttgenstein, 1961, esp.e.g.pp.49,77,80,82,85,96) and the fact that Wittgenstein in his later writings continually returns to the criticism of the view that there has to be a mental process or entity of some kind behind all intellectual activities, and he does this with the energy of one actuated by the devil of self-criticism (Shwayder, .2E.•cit., po129). The next and in virtue of the controversy which it sparked with Wundt and the n.::;sociationist school probably the most notQI"ious work of the WUrzburg school \'ras carried out by Karl BUhler, a philosopher-psychologist whom we have already met in our discussion of Bartley's account of Wittgenstein's development above. We said there that BUhler had already, before the conception of the Tra.ct~tus, published important work in the theory of 'imageless thought' of a kin:l which may have relevance to the ideas of Wittgenstein in this periodo For BU.hler'u aim, in his Wttrzburg work, was precisely to determine "what are the constituent parts (Bestandsttlcke) of our thought experiences" (quoted by Humphrey ,p.57, from BUhler, 1907). The first part of BUhler's work was entitled 11Ueber Gedanken", and in it BUhler set himself the task of producing a unified theory of thinking which would have none of the character of nzy-st:erious-beast taxonomy which had b8en a feature of the earlier Wttrzburg work on Bewusstseinslagen. To this end involving complex thinking acts, acts he employed experiments/which would reveal the mental processes which have1 in simpler cases 1 become mechanised by repetition and thereby rendered unconscious. Thus questions were put, to which the subject was to answer 'Yes' or 'No' before giving the fullest possible report of his experienceso These questions inc+uded: When Eucken speaks of a world-historical apperception,do you khow what he means'? Can yo11 get to Berlin from here in seven hours? 56 Was Eucke~ right when he said: Even the limits of knowledge cou1d not coml tc consciousness, unless Man somehow or other transcended them ? Can the ~tomic theOI""J of physics ever be proved untrue by any di • ? . scoveries The smaller the woman's foot,the larger the bill for the shoes? (Quoted by Humphrey, .2E*~* ,p.56). BUhl.cr's conclusion from these *experiments was, first of all, that images which may be present in our consciousness when we think are utterly irrelevant to the course of that thinking as such; in this he resembles Frege on the one hand, and Reinach and the Wittgenstein of (Shwayder's) Tractatus on the other.• Thus in addressing himself to the question as to how the function of carrying thought-content is distributed as between lrnages and thoughl.s _,. ... _ .. - --.OW.U.t:J.' - --~..I..- - • w•*..&..,,,.eo. A glance at the protocols will tell us: anything so fragmentary, so spora<iic, so thoroughly at the mercy of chance when it enters consciousness as the images in our thought experiences, cannot be regarded as the carrier of the close-fitting and continuous thought-content ••• The thoughts alone can be regarded as the real constituent parts of our thought-experiences. (BUhler, 1907, p. 317 as trans. by Humphrey,pp.57f)o BUhler is pointing here to a quite specific psychic realm, a realm with its own articulations, articulations which include that type of determinate content which had been hitherto disclosed by the WUrzburgers in their studies of Bewusstseinslagen, but which include also definite references to the objects of which we are thinking. There are, says BUhler, Gedanken [i.e. thought-units] in which the object of thought is clearly defined in consciousness without any image, or even without any consciousness of [a] ru:L.e or of '[a] relationo ••• We must conclude that thinking may contain an imageless modification of consciousness corresponding to the meaning of the thought. Whatever the meaning, it may appear in experience without an imageo We may, in fact, "think" an object *s~Q Reinach 1911 and my discussion in B; all of these thinkers affirmed the irrelevance of intuitive imagery to thought; Frege however combined this with * d t 1 t * t. t. f , a,s enP.;i. ties e:x;istiru; an ina er1ue. e p a onis ic concep ion o thoughts' /\in an 'eternar realm' quite 3lien, e.g., to the author of the Tractatus. 57 in the external world or an inference involving physical object without any "mental" intermediary. (Humphrey 1 s summary, .2E*~*, I It was not just a terminological advance, then, which was involved in i investigation of the thought-units which make up our thinking activity. Ye\ there are still certain questions which were lett tmanswered by Btllll.er, ques\ such as the manner in which thought-units are bound together, in consciousness, and the nature of the_ relationship between the world of thought and the world of external reality about which we think. Both of these questions were tackled in a fashion which is of great interest to our own present concerns by the last senior member of the line of Ktnpe's psychological pupils, Otto Selzn Selz (with BUh.ler) joined Ktnpe only after the latter had moved from WUrzburg/to take the chair of Philosophy in Bom. It must be stressed that before joining KUlpe Selz had worked in Munich with the Munich school of phenomenologists, including Reinach and Pf!!nder,both of whom had made important contributions to the early preTractarian Sachverhalt literature (see my~). Selz indeed published a paper on Meinongean ontology in the Lipps Festschrift which contained also Reinach's ground-breaking''Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils 11 (1911). In 1913 Selz published the first volume of a study of the laws of the ordered course of thought ('Uber die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlauf a). This work contained one terminological ~r.d two consequent conceptual advances on the analysis which had been put forward by BUhler. The terminological advance was clearly coloured by his acquaintance with the Munich phenomenologists and their Sachverhalt-ontologies, for on p.131 of Selz's work we find: Stwnpf fUhrte den Ausdruck "Sachverhalt" ein. Wir gebrauchen statt dessen den Ausdruck "Sachverh!lltnis", um durch das Wort ''Verhllltnis" die eigentUmliche Natur der Sachverh!iltnisse als ein sich zueinander in einer bestimmten Weise Verha.lten von bestimmten Gegenst~nden zurn 58 • Au~:;druck zu bringen. And the similarity of this passage to , for example, Tractatus 2.03: Im Sachverhalt verhalten sich die Gegenstttnde in bestirnmter Art und Weise zueinander** lends additional support to our arguments in ! sketching possible parallels between Selz and the Munich Sachverhalt-ontologists on the one hand and Nittgenstein's Tractarian Sachver~-ontology on the other. Selz proceeds, after a discussion of Reinach's 1911, to the following detailed characterisation of his "Sachverh!tltnisse": Sachverhaltnisse sind das in einer bestimmten Beziehung Stehen bestimmter Gegenst~nde. In allen Sachverhfil.tnissen k~nnen wir die Gegenstttnde, die in der Beziehung stehen, und die in verschiedenen Sachverhlfl.tnissen der gleichen Art verschieden sind, und die Beziehung, in der sie stehen, die in allen Sachverh!!ltnissen der gleichen Art dieselbe Beziehung ist, unterscheiden. Sachverhttltnisse sind aber kein Aggregat aus den Gegenstttnden und der Be- ~ichung, in der sie stehen, und setzen sich auch nicht aus ihnen zusammen 1.,rie ein Ganzes aus seinen Teilen, sondern das in einer bestirnmten Beziehung Stehen ist nicht nur eine in ei.n Nebeneinander anderer Gegebenheiten nicht restlos auflHsbare, also in diesem Sinne einheitliche Gegebenheit, sondern einc einheitliche Gegebenheit besonderer Art, und zwar ist es keine selbst- ~ndige Gegebenheit, vielmehr sind Sachverh.Ultnisse Mi.tgegebenheiten, die i:i der Natur anderer Gegenstt!nde, bezw. einer gegebenen Gegenstandsordnung begrUndet sind. ( P• ~ 42, Selz' s emph<.rnis). ':;e ~;aid that this chcmge of terminology corresponded to a two-fold. change of c:~~proach. Selz had asked himself how the thought-units of the broad type discussed by BUhler could unite themselves in a single mental content (or ' Komplex') as he called it. They unite themselves, Selz asserted, precisely in constituting Sachverhfiltnisse, ~ generis relational. wholes, of a type •stumpf introduced the term "Sachverha.lt". Instead of this we use "Sachverhl!ltnis", in order to express, by means of the word ''V'erh2.ltnis" (relation) ,the pecu1iar ruture of the state of affairs as a standing of determinate objects in determinate rcl<;_tions to one another. *'"In t l~e state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. 59 quite different from the wholes formed when, say, the associationists' images are merely _arranged together, side by side. And Selz could appeal to what was by then a very large literature on the logic of Sachverhalte to explain how his thoughts, as mental Sachverhttltnisse, could correspond to the logician's idealised judgments and propositions.(See Meinong 1910, Husserl 1900/01, Reinach 1911, and later Hcnecker, 1921). But Selz could appeal also to this same literature in order to gather support for his second conceptual advance. For Sel~ had noticed that it is Sachverh!fl.tnisse also which constitute the world of physical reality,to which our thoughts (normally) relate. Thus what had been no more.than a metaphorical parallel between Sachlagen and Bewusstseinslagen, the metaphor determining the coinage of the latter term by Orth and Mayer, has become, at the hands of Selz, a structural identity: Sachverh!lltnisse occur both in the sphere of thought, where they correspond to judgments in propositional form, and in the sphere of external reality, where they correspond to states of affairs which make such judgments true. Indeed, Selz argues, \dthout relational wholes of the former kind, pre-formed structures into which of the order ~*.rhich is revealed in our thoughts. Unfortunately it would take u~ too far ~field to discuss the details of this aspect of Selz's work. 'rh/re is, however, one further notion to which appeal is made by Selz which merits our attention. In our discussion of Wittgenstein and Herbart we pointed to the fact that both philosophers inroduced a two-tier theory of the combinatiõ of objects, but that Wittgenstein alone, with his distinction between •atomic' <rnd ';:iolecular' facts, had produced an account which could :promise to be ade*:1w.~te to the logical structure of our thinking. Selz, too, appeals to such 60 a two-tier account,one which, for a work published in 1913, has striking parallels to the Tr actatus account of the two tiers of atomic and molecular statal combination. According to Selz there are not only simple relational.--wholes ( einf ache Sa chvcrhttltnisse ) but also composite relational wholes (zusammengesetzte So.chverh!tltnisse): Unter einem zusammengesetzten Sachverhl!ltnis ist eine Verbindung von Sachverhltl tnissen _zu verstehen, die dadurch gekennzeichnet ist, dass die in dem Sachverhaltsverband enthaltenen Sachverh!tltnisse Sachverhaltsglieder oder Beziehungen gemeinsam haben, oder dass Sachverh!tltnisse Glieder .::i.nderer Sachverh.!tltnisse sind. (p.143)• Simple and composite relational wholes therefore correspond, as Selz points out, to si~ple and composite judgments, as distinguished, for example, in the Logik of Wundt. Selz recognises also that composite Sachverh.!tltnisse are not simply aggregates of constituent simple Sachverhfil tnisse, any more than tne i:_,tter could be conceived simply as aggregates of their constituent objects s.nd relations; rather [die] zusammengesetzte Sachverhlfltnisse sind •••• ebenso wie einfache Snchverhltltnisse unzerlegbare Einheiten, die sich aus einer eigentttmlichen Verbindung vcn einfachen Sachverh!tltnissen, also des in einer bestimmten Beziehung Stehens von bestimmten Gegenstttnden kon- ,,ti tuieren. (p.145). This completes our (provisional) sketch of relations between the '.Practatus and th•: experimental psychology and phenomenology of thinking. It is perhaps ,,:orthwhile to note, in echo of our methodological preamble above, that we are not here claiming any direct influence by Selz (or BUhler, or Reinach) on the early ',Jittgenstein. But nor, either, is our argument simply of the form: great ~Thie s~me two-tier account can also be found, of course, in Meinong's theory of Objektive (cf. the distinction between Objekt i ve t!ber Ob j ekte and Objekti ve Uber Objekt i ve), echoes of which can be found in turn in the first dozen pages of -.~i tt[;enstein' s Notebooks ( 1914-16). 61 minds think (in German) alike. Rather we wish to issue reminders of the fact thn.t ',..Jittgenstein was, in his early years, working on the fringes of a logical and psychological co.:nmunity which took for granted concepts and p:-oblems and terminology _quite alien to most recent commentators on the Tractatus. And the thinkers responsible for shaping this -conceptual framework besides, eog• Kant, Helmholtz and Wundt, were centrally Herbart, Brentano, Lipps, Meinong, Husserl, Sturnpf, :md KUlpe, and their followers in Austria, Germany, and Cambridge. S9 , We might appeal, finally, to what is perhaps an important piece of circumstantial evidence justifying an eventual allignment of the Tractatus closer to Austrian (Meinong) ontology/on the one hand and to the experimental psychology of thinking (KUlpe) on the other. During his internment a:a a pr~soner-of-war in Monte Cassino when,it seems, .the ontology of the ~ctatus was receiving its final shaping, Wittgenstein struck up a friendship with a schoolteacher, a certain Dr Ludwig H~nsel, later to become Professor at a Viennese grammar school. Wittgenstein and H1tnsel for long after remained close friends. It seems to have been ID!nsel who convinced Wittgenstein that he should take up schoolteaching like H!!nsel himself; and Httnsel made regular visits to Wittgenstein :Ln the villages where he taught in the years following the War. Bartley ci:~serts that H.!!nsel, whom he describes, somewhat dismissively,as a puritanical Roman Catholic, played a role a.kin ta that of spiritual adviser and father confessor to Wittgenstein throughout his life, but no ~ention is made of a possible influence by or through Hl!nsel on l:Ji t tgenstein' a philosophy. Instead we are referred by Bartley to a work by W!nr.;el entitled Die Jugend und die leibliche Liebe (Youth and Carnal Love) (1938) \vhich ~~* , ,*L:i..ey describes as a polemical tract against masturbation.(1974,po14f), Not having 'yet seen a copy of this tract I cannot judge the veracity of Bartley's de&cription; -we have to remember that there was an important tradition of eminently intellectually respectable psychosexual literature in Austria , ranging from Freud and Weininger (a favourite of Wittgenstein's throughout his life), to Ehrenfels' works on polygamy and eugenics. But it seems possible tl-..n.t Bartley is less than fair in his treatment of Htlnsel. For there is another, not unimpressive work by H!lnsel, published much later significantly enough in the Ehrenfels memorial volume (1960)-a paper entitled "Der Gegenstand des tlegriffs und die Logik;•, in which Hl:lnsel reveals a fine sense of the histories of philosophy and psychology, a recognition (which echoes Henecker's 1921) of the importance of ontology for the study of logic (cf. the reference to Denkund Gegenstandslot-?-k on p.176), ~a far from superficial understanding of the " . .:.r.:;.ct::i.tus. )*ihat i;;; most crucial for us in this article is that mmsel lists his i::fh~trnces. On p.161 he writes: My own road began with Meinong. For essential stimulation I have to thank Alois HtHler and F. Weinha.ndl [a successor of Meinong as head of -------- '"The ;.rork includes also what is, in effect, a discussion of Frege's Begriffs- ::Jchrift, in which the following diagram ist i::; employed to illustrate the Fregean notion of saturation. Given a functional axprcs.;ion 'f', with which are associated the characteristics (Merkmale) a,b, ~, and d, then the first pair of circles symbolises some (complete) object x, t'.-10 second pair the (incomplete) function f( ) , and the whole diagram the (complete) proposition'f(:x:)'. 63 the GrRz Institute of Experimental Psychology ] and a stronger also a more personal effect was had upon me by Ludwig Wittgenstein.(My trans.) From this we can assume what should be checkable in the records of Graz and Vienna Universities that since H!!nsel lists Meinong first, it was already as a student, before meeting Wittgenstein and discussing with him the ideas of the l'ractatus that Httnsel had acquired his knowledge of Meinong' s ideas. But Htlnsel now goes on, in the same passage, to point out that, in retrospect, he sees th::lt the thoughts he had achieved through Meinong' s, Htlfler' s and Wittgenstein'n influence, he might also have found first of all in the works of • Oswald KUlpe and Edmund Husserl. :!:*1 the light of these remarks it might be expedient to issue the following ch~llengeo In the Preface to the Tractat~ Wittgenstein writes: ••• what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else. I will only mention that I am indebted to Frege' s great •11orks and to the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for a large part of the stimulation of my thoughts. •1h<~t follows is a m::i.tter of interpretation, but it_ seems that we can infer from .1ittgenstein' s words that there were oth~ thinkers involved in the stimulation of his thoughts, thinkers of whom l:littgenstein was aware, even if only obliquely. •r:.esides these names Hfulsel lists also E.C.assjrer and N.Hartmann, and finally a work which I have not yet seen bearing an intriguingly Tractarian title: Die Struktur des logischen Gegenstandes,by OoHazay, Berlin, 1915. 64 The challenge, then, is to suggest candidates for such a role outside the group of German and Austrian thinkers especially Herbart, Brentano, .. :Meinong, Stumpf, Husserl, KtJlpe, Lipps and the Munich Sachverhalt ontologists who hwe distinguished themselves in the course of these investigations. Barry Smith University of Sheffield February 1978 ti"\ r-- •teacher-pupil relationahi ps -other relationships g:, t'd rd 0 •rt ~rt S::kr-10 CD ,g H .cl I> CD • al 0 El~iJ!li!ll>a 0 .p t.) IQ O'l I> I rd '1t •• ,l:l ~ 5 rt > 111 a a1 HS:: k ~.p ~~~-a; G Ht~I g,~ ID 0 H s::i rt I> s:: Ill ..... 8' - - ~~£dtl <iB AR to Lipps,Mainong ... T.S.Eliot I Titchener \ t»Wundt, Brentano,Witasek ______ ____ _McJougall ~--==---~-r-~~~~~ c.s.My-ara <" E.B.Holt New Realists Carnap Vienna Circle r.L.,) H<!-Yek ,. A.SchUtz r Psycl:.ologicai Schools and I Institutes of ;Experime:ital I Psychology I . **- .. Cornell I Institute ( 'l'i tchener~,, Cambridge Institute I (Warcl ~ •• ) I I I Graz School. (Meillong) I I I Freud :'• • E:=:::~::::==~~~~~~~-;;6,'=j~-.;~~~~~~~~~~-r;Berlin School. (Stumpf) \Vertheime] Herbart * Ktnller Frankfurt .....___ D.Katz (GestaJ.t D Webe1*- \ * ~1'itchayer . o Alexander£ GB """ C.S.~ers Ja.mea ~ USA Fechner / ,.. . _ \ ----Wundt * H.Mttnsterberg .-. Koffka School E.Jaensch Psych1 ology) H=ich School I CT.Lipps) GUttillgcn School (l'.Ull.er) I Mitlrzburs School. (Kl!lpe) h-cibu:-g Scl:.cr-1. ' (~:UO.Sterberg) Leipzig School (Vund.t} . I

APPENDIX I. 65 Addenda to the Bibliography of Pre-Tractarian Occurrences of the tenn 'Sachverhalt' (see pp.14-16 of Smith, ~.) 1893 HUSSERL, E. 1893a HUSSERL, E. 1908 GOMPERZ, H. 1910 HEINRICH, E. 1911 SELZ, O. ? 1912 DRIESCH, H. 1912 KiJLPE, O. "A.Voigts 1 elementare Logik' und meine Darstellungen zur Logik des logiachen Calculs", Vierteljahrschrift fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 17, pp.111-20, cf.p.112. 11Antwort auf die vorstehende 'Erwiderung' des Herrn Voigt", ibid., pp.508-11, cf. pp.5o8 and 510. Weltanschauungslehre, vol.II/1, Jena. Untersuchungen zur Lehre vom Begriff, Dissertation (under Husserl), GHttingen. ''Exiatenz ala Gegenstandsbestimmtheit", MUnchener Philoeophieohe Abhand.lungen,(Festschrift for T. Lipps), ed. AoPfc!lnder, Leipzig, PP• 255-93. Ordnungslehre, 1st edo (I have examined only the 2nd ed.1923). Die Realisierung. Ein Beitrag zur Grundlegung der Realwissenschaften, I, Leipzig: Hirzel, cf.p.11: Wir sehen davon ab, class es Gegenst~de verschiedener Ordnung geben kann, je nachdem ob dasjenige, was eine Beschaffenheit oder Beziehung hat, als Gegenstand betrachtet wird, oder diese Beschaffenheit oder Beziehung oder gar noch weitere Derivata als Gegenstc!lnde gelten. Die .allgemeinsten Sachverhalte, die auf Grund dieser Bestimmungen mHglich sind, lassen sich als ein Sein oder Bestehen von Gegenstttnden, Beschaffenheiten und Beziehungen, als ein ~ von Beschaffenheiten und Beziehungen und als ein Stehen in Beziehungen bezeichnen. (Cf. the quotation from Selz 1913 on p.'51 above). 1913 HUSSERL, E. 1913 REINACH, A. 1915 MEINONG, A. Ideen zu einer reinen Phttnomenologie und phllilomenologischen Erstes Buch, Halle:. .. Niemeyer, as repr. from Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phMnomenologische Forschung, 1, 1-323. "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des-*bttrgerlichen Rechts", in Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phllnomenologische Forschung, 1,pp.~847, repr. in Reimch 1921 and as a book:~ Ph!tnomenologie des Rechts, Munich: K~sel, 1953. fiber Moglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Leipzig: Barth , pp. 153, 157f, 255. 66 APPEIIDIX II • .A Short Glossary of Meinongean Terminology in the Tractatus q = probu~ly obtained by back-translation of Russell's Eñlish translations of Meinong's original German terms. ~~ = corresponds to a marginal note in the margin of onr or other of the two copies of ths Tractatus annotated by Ryie, now deposited in the 1ib1*nry of Lineacre College, Oxford. Ryle's notes usually consist of either '.AJ,J' (for Alexius Meinong) or 'AM?',with indications in the text, but sometimes he gives references to passages in Meinong 1 s works , nnd sometimes he includes short comments. ~ ~~ Anna.hme 4.063,(cf. Russell, Principles (1903) § 477). J:/ ~~ bestehep, das Bestehen; bestehen aus , Bestandteil Dimension 5.475 see Farbenraum existieren, die Existenz p ,. Exp on en t ? I={ ~~ der Fall sein ~~ formale Eigenscha:f'ten 4.122 ~~ Farbenraum 2.0131 cf. Meinong 1903 .• § 5 Die Farbenraum und seine Dimensionen: Wie jeder eigentliche K6rper, so ist auch die Farbenk6rper im Raume und partizipiert an dessen Eig~nchaften; den bier in Betra.clt kommenden Raum aber ganz ausdrtlcklich as Farbenraum zu bezeichnen und als das eigentliche Objekt apriorischer Farbenerkenntnis dem Farbenk6rper als dem Objekt der einsohlBgigen, im Prinzip empirisohen Feststellungen ganz grundslitzlich gegenilberzustellen, k6nnte, wenn ich recht sehe, Uber manche Schwierigkeit hinweghelfen. Insbesondere m6chte dadurch die Gefahr, wenn nicht beseitigt, so doch einigermassen ferner gertlckt sein, die Dimensionen des Farbenraumes von speziellen Bestimmungen am Farbenk6rper nicht ausreichend auseinander zu halbm ••• (p.12) er. e.lso p39: Unser Wissen vom Farbenraume iat von Natur ebenso apriorisch wie unser Wissen vom eigentlicben Raume: es ist Farbengeometria. Unser wissen vom Farbenk8rper ist von Natur empirisch und inaoforn Farbenpsychologie. (Compare,eog., 6035). 'r (i;) ~~ *v~ ~~ 67 MEIN ONG-GLOSSARY Cf.also Meinong 1907, p.11. In relation to the text of 2.0131 Jl3le pointe to the following reference to Meinong'a fiber Annahmen (1910), p.135: Kann ich also allgemein ein Objek:tiv erfasaen, obne ein Objekt A mitzuerfassen? Die Verwandtschaft mit der anderen Fr88e, ob man an Rot denken kann, ohne an Ausdehnung, und ob etwa an Farbe, ohne an eine bestimmte Farbe zu denken, liegt auf der Hand. and to similar passages in 1907, pp.15, 16, 32. Gegenstand GerUst ? §eachehen 6041 interns Relation 4.123 Kornplex Konfiguration M8elichkeit See Wahrscheinlichkeitss!tze nesative Tatsache neben 4.111 Ryle compares Wittgenstein's Das Wort "Philosophie" muss etwas bedeuten, was Uber oder unter, aber nicht neben den Naturwissenschaften steht. with Meinong's Was den Besten aller Zeiten als letztes und var allem wilrdiges Ziel ihres Wissenstriebes vorgeschwebt hat, jenes Erfassen des Weltganzen nach seinem Wesen und seinen letzten GrUnden, das kann doch nur Sache einer umfassenden Wissenschaft [Metaphysik, Philosophie, Gegenstandstheorie] sein neben den Einzelwissenschaften.(Meinong, ed., 1904, p.4, Meinong's own emphasis). ft Nichtbestehen Notwendigkeit see Wahrscheinlichkeitssft.tze below. ~~ nur-m8glich 2.0121 Cf .Keinong 1915 pp.99f: Es ist der Fall, von dem der so populllre Satz gilt: was tatsAohlich - *man sagt gew8hnlich "wirklich" iat, das ist auch m6glich. Es ist eine gleich den sonstigen i.mplizierten M6glichkeiten meist praktisch ziemlich unwichtige M6glichkeit, die hinter der Tatsltchlichkeit in besonderem Masse als blosses Beiwerk zurUcktritt. Ein solches Objektiv ist eben "auch" m6glich, und das ist eine ganz andere Sachlage, als wenn etwas gar nicht tatsllchlich, also "nur" m8glich ist. Auf Wendungen dieser Art kann man sich berufen, wenn man M6glichkeiten, die bloss 68 MEIN ONG-GLOSSARY in Tatsltchliohkeiten impliziert sind, soldien, die gleichsam Eigenberechtigung haben, gegenUber mit etwas barbarischer, aber, wie mir s cheint, deutlicher Ausdruck:sweise als "Auchm6glichkei ten" benennt, denen man die eigenberechtigten M8glichkeiten ala "Nurm6slichkei ten" an die Seite gestellt werden k8nnen. Von den Nurm8glichkeiten ist im Sinne des Komplementengesetzes zu behaupten, dass jede mit der Nurm6glichkeit des Gegenteils zusammenbesteht. Cf .also .2E.*.ei!*PP•222f; Findlay, 1963 pp.206ff; Griffin,1964,p.39n. Meinong's usage seems also to have inf1.uenced Ingarden in his opposition between auch-intentionale and rein intentionale Gegenstlinde in 1964/65. ~ Operation The parallels between Meinong' s theory of operations, whi_ch is presented in the 6th chapter of his fiber Annahmen,and Wittgenstein's theory of operations in the Traotatus have been insufficiently stressed. (As have also the parallels with Husserl's early theory of operatioñ* developed at the time of his Philosophie der Arithmetik (1891): see especially Husserl 1970). Meinong writes: Soviel scheint mir zunRchst sicher, dass man das hypothetische Urteil erleben kann, diese aus Annshmen und Urteilen zusammengesetzte Operation, ohne Uber dieses Annehmen und Urteilen hinauszugehen, und sonaohauch,ohne jene Bedeutung mitzuerfassen. Weiter schei.nt mir nun, dass dieselbe Operation auch zu Erfassen ihrer Bedeutung dient, sobald man von ihr nur sozusagen den erforderlichen Gebrauch maoht •••• [Fundierung kennen wir] bisher nur als Objekt- :f'u.ndierung, d.h. als Fundierung .!2,!! Objekten durch Objekte; k6nnte es nun nicht auch eine Objektivf'undierung geben, bei der bier zunltchst nur an Fundierung durch Objektive gedacht ist? Genauer also: kHnnte die im obigen beschriebene Operation an Vorderund Nachobjektiv nicht die produzierende T~tigkeit sein, die etwa ein neues Vorstellungsoder Begriffsgebilde ergibt, das ein Superius erfasst, dessen Inferiora in flhnlicher Heise Objektive sind, wie solches etwa bei einem Kollektiv von Objektiven der Fall ist. (p.208.) Meinong distinguished not only the 'Wenn '-Operation, but also !Aber!. and (presumably) 'Und!.Operations, and Operations 'die man durch "ja" oder "nein" ausdrtlckt'. Note that 'Wann' here cannot be the 'Wenn' of material implication (though each õLthe other operations here •discussed in detail in K. Mulligan's forthcoming Manchester dissertationo MEINONG-OLOSSARY menti onod c11n b a correlRted wi th ono or othe r t ruth-1\mctional operation or the t yp o admit t ed iJ1 i ho Tr a c tntus : tho 11J o.11 -opor u t ion , f o r oxnmplo . corresponds to tho unary t rut h-function which is opxres oed irl tho t nb le : P Ja(p) T T F F Ao cording to the account of Wittgenste in' s theory of operations given in the text above (see esp. pp. 3or) Wittgen s t e in oould not have allowed any operationa which, like Meinong ' D ' Wenn' oper ation, involve 1vha t migh t be called meaninG-content or entailment-content (this is the ' extension ~ a lism' of tho Tractutu s). To admit such ope r a tions would be to risk the breakdown of the i somorphism-rela tion between picturing thought or proposition and pictured f act. A philos opher such as Meinong !!2J:. commi ttad to the isomorphism theory can, of course , admit non-extens ional operations. To admit such opera tions into the Tractatus would, be it noted, L~oediately extend the realm of entiti e s admissible a s facts, since it . ' , would then become possible to include those facts which, although belonging to the object-world toVtard which our thoughts are normally directe d, yet involve intensional constituents: most importantly it would be possible to include legal facts (Brutus murdered Cae sar, !! Brutus murdered Caesar then he mus t be punished), f acts whi ch are as , for example, Engisoh has shown (1962, p.417}-absolute ly unaccountable for within a purely extensionalist framework. positive Ta tsaohe Sachverhalt See Smith, A and Appendix I above. ~ Satzverband So-Sein 6.41 Ta tsache tatsH.chlich sich verhnlten See Sachverhalt 70 MEIN ONG-GLOSSARY l+ Vlahrscheinlichkei tss.\!.tze ,5.1,511: Bs gibt keinen besonderen Gegenstand, der den Wahrscheinlich:ceits-, s~tzen eigen wltre. The major thesis of Meinong's mammoth work, tfuer M8gli~it wid Wahrscheinlichkeit is precisely that there are such objects which are the carriers of possibilityand probability-determinations. See Findlay 1963, pp.209ff., and Poser, 1972. I:( ~~ Wie wid Was 3.221, .50552, (cf.6.41, 6.432, 6.44) Cf. e.g. Meinong, ed., 1904, p.1}5ff: § 7: Koinzidierende GegenstBnde. Wassein wid Wiesein. zeitlicher Gegenstand ~ Zufall 9 zusammengesetzt "' * * Note that clearly the designation of many of the above terms as 'Meinongean' has to be taken with a pinch of salt. But even were it the case that this termi.uological overlap could be shown to rest on absolutely no direct influence of Meinong' s works upon Wittgenstein this would not, by the arguments of § 0 above, deprive these notes of all value. 71 APPENDIX III. W. Jerusalem and the Context Principle. The following passages are taken from Jerusalem's book Die Urth!il.sfunction. Eine psychdlogische und erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung, BraumUller, Vienna and Leipzig, 1895, Ch.I, § 4 Logische und gramrnatische Bedeutung des Urtheilsproblems. It has a three-fold interest, (i) because of the light which it throws on the prevalence of principles such as that enunciated by Wittgenstein at 3.3 that nur im Zusammenhange des Satzes hat ein Name bedeutung, which was in turn inspired by a virtually identical principle defended by Frege in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884); (ii) in virtue of the fact that Jerusalem's Einleitung in die Philosophie (Vienna, 1897) was to be found in the library of Wittgenstein's father in Vienna; (iii) and also because Jerusalem, Profe3sor of Philosophy in Vienna, a philosopher (distantly) allied to both Mach and Herbart , seems to have enjoyed a certain vogue inAustria at the begiru~ing of the century (his Einleitung,for example, had gone into 10 editions by 1923). p.26 Das Wort hat ••• eine, ich mHchte sagen, sinnliche, physiologische Selbstttndigkeit, als die Articulationen, die zum Aussprechen desselben nHtig sind, einen relativ abgeschlossenen Act bilden. Gegen die psychologische Selbst!tndigkeit, die man dem Bedeutungsgebiet eines Wortes zuzuschreiben pflegt, ja, die man sogar oft als selbstverst!l.ndlich betrachtet, muss jedoch schon hier energisch Einspruch erhoben werden. zu einem wirklichen Leben gelangt das Wort erst in demjenigen Gebilde, in welchem auch die Sprache selbst erst wirklich und lebendig wird, nttrnlich im Satze ••• Das Wort hat in der Sprache nur als Element des Satzes wirkliche Existenz, und nur der Zweig der Grammatik, der sich mit dem Satzbau beschttftigt, k.J.!lJl die Gesetze des wirklichen Sprachlebens cnthUllen. p.28 Das Wort, aagten wir eben, gewinne erst im Satze wirkliches Leben und Sein. Der Glaube an die psychologische Selbstttndigkeit der Wtlrter als TrMger bestimmter Vorstellungen wird indessen durch mannigfache Umst!lnde erzeugt und befestigt. ••• die Sprache [wird] nur in S~tzen actuell [und man kann] ihr Leben und ihre Gesetze nur an dem erforschen und erkennen ••• ,was von einem bestimmten Individuum als Ausdruck seines psychischen Geschehens in Stttzen verk~rpert wird. p.30 Noch viel weniger als das Urtheil darf ~ Begriff eine von seinem 72 Zeichen unabh!fngige Existenz beanspruchen. Der Begriff entsteht erst infolge sprachlich gedachterUrtheile, seine Existenz ist durchaus abhllng{g von der eines conventionellen Zeichens. Das Wort ist nicht der Ausdruck, sondern ein Besta.ndtheil des Begriffes, welcher eben durch die Synthase von Wortund Sinnesempfindung entsteht, und nur durch das Wort seine Einheit und Consistenz erhtllt. Schwieriger scheint es, das Verhttltnis zwischen ~ und Vorstellung zu bestimmen ••• /31/ ••• Es ist gewiss nicht mit jeder Vorstellung ein Wort, aber auch keineswegs mit jedem Wort eine Vorstellung verbunden ••• p.3~ Wollte ich den Vorgang, der in meinem Bewusstsein durch das Wort "Tisch" erweckt wird, genau beschreiben, dann ktlnnte dies nur in der Form von SUtzen geschehen, deren Subject Tisch wttre. Die Prttdicate dieser SUtze liegen potentiell schon im Worte "Tisch", werden aber erst actuell, wenn ich meine ganze Wahrnehmung durch ein vollstHndiges Urtheil f orme und gestalte. Die Forderung zu solcher Gestaltung und Gliederung ist aber schon in dem Worte "Tisch" enthalten, und so ist auch das Wort "Tisch", psychologisch betrachtet, nicht eine Vorstellung sondern ein Urtheilselement.[•J [Auch -Substantive, die sinnlich wahrnehmbare Objecte bezeichnen,J erweisen sich ••• als ••• Urtheilselemente, die erst im Satze ihre wahre Mission erftillen. Die Wtlrter sind wie behauene, fUr eine beatimmte Mauerstelle hergerichtete Steine, denen man es ansieht, auch wenn sie aus dem ganzen GefUge /33/ losgel8at sind, dass sie in ein gr~sseres Ganze geh"ren und erst da ihre Bestimmung erfUllen. Solche Steine kann man ja auch mineralogisch und geometrisch bestimrnen, als ob sie selbstttndige Existenz h!ltten, ihre wahre Bedeutung erkennt man jedoch erst, wenn man das GefUge kennen lernt, in welchem sie ihren Platz einzunehmen bestimmt sind. Die wahre Bestimrnung jedes Wortes ist es, eine Stelle in einem Urtheile einzunehmen, und wenn man sie genau untersucht, so entdeckt man, wie bei den Steinen, die behauenen Fla'chen und vermag dann anzugeben, welche Stelle im Urtheilsgeftlge das Wort einzunehmen bestimmt ist. Das Wort ist somit psychologiach nicht Vorstellung, s ondern Urtheilselement. Sein Bedeutungsgebiet umfasst nicht die Vorstellungen, die es erweckt, sondern die Urtheile, in die es als Element eingehen kann. Diese Einsicht dUrfte sich, sobald sie allgemein wird, auch fUr den Sprachunterricht und bei der Anlegung von WHrterbUchern fruchtbringend erweiseno Wir sehen also, dass die Untersuchung des Urtheilsacts sich auchfUr grammatische Fragen als bedeutungsvoll erweist. •Jerusalem's own emphasis. Compare 2.0122: Es ist uruñglich,dassWorte in zwei verschiedenen Weisen auftreten, allein und im Satz. "" I'- ,',"!""" . •teacher-pupil relationahips -other relationships ., b ~ 0 s:: l! kC: .,:~~11 S~idl!IQ~ O+>O '° Cl2 ., • od A. **'°~~,... >ca QS H S:: J.f !>) .p ~~~-a; H+> I 0 S l ooaori Cl)b~~ ã .... ec~i!s'l D <iB A-H Weber- \ * ~Titchyner . Alexander£GB """ C.S.fera Jamea ~ USA Fechner / ,,. . . '\ ----Wundt * H.MUnsterberg to Lipps,Meinong i' 1'.S.Eliot I 'l'itchener \ t~Wundt, Brentano,Witasek .. , . .. ... E.B.Holt New Realists Carnap Vienna Circle • .L'"\"') -Higek ,, A.SchUtz f Psycl:ologicai Schools and I Institutes o! Expe rime:ita1 I Psychology * 1 . - . Cornell I Institute ('l'itchener)., I Graz School (Meinong) I I I Freud Berlin School. (Stump!) WertheimeJ * K6hler Frankfurt Ko!fka School D.Katz . (Gestal.t E.Jae:isch Psych- ! ology) 1-lll:lich S~hool I I (T.Lipps) Gtlttingcn School (KUll.er) a'Urzb-:::g School. (Kt!lpe) F:reibu:-g School. ' (~~terberg) Leipzig School (Vu.ndt) f I I l * ... *- .. . I i_ - - . . - ** *; ~ ... ., ~ *.* . _. i ____ ~ - -- *-* 74 BIBLIOGRAPHY (Contains, besides references to works mentioned in the text,aleo source material developing further certain lines of investigation). 1/:. against an item indicates that it is contained in my bibliography of pre-Tractarian occurrences of the term 'Sachverhalt' (see !• pp.14-16 and Appendix I above.) 1897 . * ADAMS , J. The Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education, London: Heath. ALiAIRE, E.B. ''The 'Tractatus' : Nominalistic er Realiatic?1J, from Essays in Ontology, Nijhoff: *.Hague, aa repr. in Copi and Beard, eds., 1966. * 1972 AMBROSE,A and LASEROWITZ, M., eds. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philoaophl 1974 _ BARTLEY, W.W. 1974a _., __ 1950 BOB.ING, E.G. 1893 BRADLEY,. F.H. . 1907 BtfHLER, K. 19o8 1908a and Language, London: Allen and Unw:Ln. Wittgenstein, London: Quartet. ''Theory of Language and Philosophy -of Science aa Instruments of Educational Reform: Wittgenstein and Popper as Austrian Schoolteachers", iñ- odological and Historical Esaaya in the Natura1 and Social Sciences, eds. R.S.Cohen and M.W. Wartowsky, Dordrecht: Reidel, pp.307-388. A History of Experimental Psychology, Znd.ed., New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon. 11Tatsachen und Probleme zu einer Psychologie der Denkvorgttnge: I. tfber Gedanken", Archiv f11r die geaamte Psychologie, 9, 297-305. ~, "II. ifber Gedankenzuaammenh!lnge", ,£?.. , 12, 1-23. Idem, "III. 'Uber Gedankenerinnerungen", ib., - 12, 24-92. 1966 COPI, I.M. and BEARD, R.W., eds. Essa1s on Wittgenstein's Tractatua, London: Routledge. 1930 1f 90 1897/98 1960 1964 1967 1955 1879 1884 1893 1964 1960 1972 EATON, H.O. EHRENFELS, C.v. .. ELIOT, T.s. ENGELMANN, P. ENGISCH, K. FINDLAY, J.N. FRmE, G. GRIFFIN, J. HABBEL, I. HALLER, R. ,ed. 75 BIBLIOGRAPHY . The Austrian Philosophy of Values, Norman: University of Oklahoma Presa. " . "Uber Gestal tquali tttten", Vierteljahrsohrift fUr wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 14, 249-292; repr. with Ehrenfela' other psychological writings in Ehrenf els 1960. System der Werttheorie, 2 vols.Leipzig: Reisland. Gestalthaftes Sehen, memorial volume for Ehrenfels, ed. F. Weinhandl, Darmstadt: Wissenacbaftliche Buchgesellschaft • Knowledge and E?Cperience in the Philosophy of F.H.Bradley, London: Allen and Unwin; first printing of Eliot's 1916 Harvard Dissertation. Letters from Ludwig Wittgenstein with a Memoir, B.F.McGuinness, ed., Oxford: Blackwell. 11Vom Sinn des hypothetischen juristiachen Urteils", in Existenz und Ordnung, {Festachrift for Erik Wolf), FrankfUrt: Klostermann. "The Logic of Bewusataeinslagen': as repr. in Language, Mind and Value, London: Allen and Unwin1 1963, pp.182-96. Begriffsschrift, Halle. Grundlagen der Arithmetik, Eine logisch mathematische Untersuchl.ll!t Uber den Begriff der Zahl, Breslau: Koebner. Grundgesetze der Aritlunetik, I, : Jena. Wittgenstein's Logical Atornism, Oxford. Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phttnomenologie und bei Thomas von Aguin, Regensburg: Habbel. Jenseits von Sein und Nichtsein. Beitrttge zur Meinong-Forschung, Graz: Akademische Druckund Verlagsanstalt. 1977 HALLE'l'r, G. 1938 HltNSEL, L. 1952 HAYEK, F.H • .. 1863 _ _ -*_-HELMHOLTZ, H.v. 1824/25 HEBBARl', J .F. 1890 1897 ~ *-1921 HONECKER, M. 19.51 HUMPHREY, G. .1891 HUSSERL, E. ://. 1900/01 1970 1955 HUSSERL, G. 76 BIBLIOGRAPHY A Companion to Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, Ithaca: Cornell. Die Jugend -und die leibliche Liebe: SexualpMdagogische Betrachtungen, Innsbruck-Viennãunichi . Tyrolia Verlag. "Der Gegenstand des Begriffs und die Logik", in Ehrenfels, 1960. The Sensory Order: An Inguiry into the Foundations of Theoretical Psychology, London: Routledge. Die Lehre von den Tonempfindungen, Brauschveig: Vieweg. Psychologie als Wissenschaft, neu gegrtlndet auf' Erfahrung, Metaphysik und Mathematik, 2 vols., as repr. in Herbart's Sllinmtldche Werke, G. Hartenstein, ed. , vols. V and VI, Hamburg and Leipzig: Voss. Logik, Vienna. Psychologie, Vienna. Gegenstandslogik und Denklogik. Vorschlag zu einer Neugestaltung der Logik, Berlin. Thinking. An Introduction to its Experimenta1 Psycholoe;r, .New York: Wiley. Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und Logische Untersuchungen, I, Halle. Logische Untersuchungen, '1st ed., Halle: Niemeyer. Philosophie der Arithmetik mit ergHnzenden Texten * (1890-1901), L. Eley, ed., Hague: Nijhoff, Husserliana vol.XII; esp. the Abbandlungen:_ I. "Zur Logik der Zeichen (Semiotik)",(pp.340-73),, V. "Zum Begriff der Operation" (pp.4o8-429). "Recht und Proz~ss", in Recht und Zeit, FrankfUrt: Klostermann, pp.145-74. HUSSERL, G. 1964/65 INGARDEN, R. .. JERUSALEM, W. 1897 1972 JOHNSTON, W. 1970 KLEIN, D.B. 1922 idJLPE, O. 1905 LIPPS, T. 1911 [LIPPS, T.] 1901 MARBE, K • . 77 BIBLIOGRAPHY "Der handelnde Mensch und die Dinge: Prolegomena zu einer Theorie dee Eigentume", Part I of Person, Sache, Verbalten, Frankfurt: Klostermann, esp. pp.49-56: ''Exkura zum Thema 'Estates'"• Der Streit urn die Exiatenz der Welt, 1st two vols., I: Existentialontologie, II: Forrnalontologie, in two parts: II/1 Form und Weeen, II/2 Welt und Bewusstsein, Tlfbingen: Niemeyer. (Original Polish edition, Sp6r o istnienie twiata, 2 vols. Cracow, 1947/48.) Die Urtheil.6f.\mction, * Vi~nna;t_ BraumUller*. > *_ Einleitung in die Philosophie, "lst.ed., Vienna. The Austrian Mind: An Intellectual and Social History, 1848-1938, University of California Press. A History of Scientific Psychology, London: Routledge. Vorlesungen Uber Psychologie, 2nd ed., Leipzig. "Inhalt und Gegenstand: Psychologie und Logik", Sitzungsberichte der philosophisch-philologischen und der hiatorischen K1asse der K~niglichen Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, pp.511-669. Mtlnchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (Lippa ~- echrift), A. PfMnder, ed., Leipzig. Experimentell-pszchologische Unterauchungen Uber das Urteil, eine Einleitung in die Logik, Leipzig. 1901 MAYER, A. and ORTH, J. "Zur qualitativen Unterauchung der Associationen11 , MEINONG, A. Zeitachrift :fUr Psychologie und Pbya:idl.ogie der Sinneaorgane, 26, pp.1-13. Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie, Graz: Leuschner und Lubensky, repr. in GA III (cf.Meinong 1969/72 below). fiber die Bedeutung des Webe:ischen Gesetzes': Beitrllge zur Psychologie des Vergleichens und Measens, Leipzig: Voss; GA II. ... • 1903 19o6 1907 I * 1910 *" 1915 MEINONG, A. --- .. ' --- .*; 1969172 -1904 MEINONG, A. ed. 1.871 . MENGER, C. 19o6 HESSER, A. 1899 MOORE, G.E. 1972 MORSCHER, E. 19?2 , NYIRI, J.C. 1974 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY "Uber Gegenstllnde h6herer Ordnung und deren Verh!Utnis zur inneren Wahrnehmung", Zeitschritt fUr Psychologie und Pb;reiologie der Sinnesorgane, 11, 180-2721 GA II. 11Bemerkungen Uber den Farbenk8rper und das Mischungsgesetz", .£?•• 331 1-Bo; GA I. tlber die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unaeres Wissens, Berlin: Springer; GAV. 'Uber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften, Leipzig: Voigtllfnder; GAV. ffber Annahmen, 2nd.ed., Leipzig: Barth; GA IV. ffRer MHglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Beitrttge zur Gegenatandatheorie und Erkenntniatheorie, Leipzig: Barth; GA VI • Gesamtausgabe, R. Haller~., eds., Graz. (6 vols. to date). =GA above. Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandatheorie und Psychologie, Leipzig: Barth. Grundatttze der Volkswirtschaftalehre, Vienna. ''Experimentell-psychologische Untersuchungen Uber daa Denken" 1 Archiv fUr die geaamte Psycholofde, • 8, 1-224. ''The Nature of Judgment", ~' n.s., 8, 176-93. ''Von Bolzano zu Meinong: Zur Geschichte dee logiechen Realismus" 1 in Haller, ed., 1972, pp.69-102. "Das unglUckliche Leben des Ludwig Wittgensteins", Zeitschrift ft1r philosophische Forschung, 26, 585-608. "Beim Sternenlicht der Nichtexistierenden* ~ ~ zu; -_: .-~_:::"*. ideologiekritischen Interpretation. des plat~;:--'- *, _ ierenden Antipsychologismus;' Inquirz, 17, 399-443. ' ( I' 1976 NYIRI, J.C. 1976a 79 BIBLIOGRAPHY "Zur Philosophiegeschichte 6sterreich-Ungarns. Eine sozialpsychologische Skizze", Annal.ea Uni verai tatis Scientarium Budapestinensia de Rolando E~tv~a Nominatae, 10, 93-113. "Wittgenstein's New Traditionalism", Acta Philosophica Fennica, 28: 1-3 (Essays on Wittgenstein in Honour of G.H.von Wright), 503-512. *1952 OESTERREICHER,J.M. "Adolf Reinach", in Walls are Crumbling, New York: 1956 PLUCKNETT, G. 1972 * POSER, H. //: 1911 REINACH, A. 1921 1921a RUSSELL, B.A.W. 1900 1903 19<>4 Devin Adair, pp.99-134. A Concise History of the Common Law, 5th ed. "Die M"glichkeitsbegriff Meinongs", in Haller, ed., 1972, ppo187-204o "Zur Theorie des negativen*1Urteils", in [Lipps] 1911 1 pp.196-254, repr. in Reinach 1921, pp.56116, English translation in preparation. Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Reinach's students, with an Introduction by H. Conrad-Martius, Halle: Niemeyer. 1'Vortrag Uber Phttnomenologie", in Reinach 1921. "On Phenomenology", English trans. of Reinach 1921a by Dallas Willard, The Personalist, 50, pp.194-221. An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry, Cambridge. Review of Meinong 1896 (fiber die Bedeutung cles Weber 1schen Gesetzea), Mind, n.s., 8, 251-56. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leib- ~' Cambridge. The Principles of Mathematica, Cambridg:l. "Meinong's Theory of Complexes and Assumptions", ~' n.a., 13, in 3 parts: I, pp.204-19; II, PP• 336-541 III, pp.509-24; repr. in Rusaell ' 1973. ... ,, .. • 1905 RUSSELL, B.A.W. 1906 1907 80 BIBLIOGRAPHY Review of Meinong, ed.,19o4 (Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie), !:!!!:!!1 n.s., 14, pp.530-38, repr. in Russell, 1973• Review of Meinong, 19o6 (fiber die Erfahrungagrundlagen unseres Wissens), ~' n.s., 15, pp.412-15 1 repr. in Russell 1973. Review of Meinong, 1907 ("Uber die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften), ~' n.s., 16, 436-39. I . . 1910/13 --:with A.N.Whitehead Principia Mathematica, 3 vols., Cambridge. 1973 18,54 1953 1967 1966 " 1911 1t: 1913 1954 1976 A RIEMANN, a. - - - - ---- -SCHAPP, W. SCHMIIYI', S.J. Essays in Analysis, D.Lackey, ed., London: Allen and Unwin. uf.tber die Hypotheseri,welche. der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen", variously reprinted. - - - ----- - -- - - -. In Geschichten Verstrickt, Frankfurt:Meiner • ''Der Versuch 'nicht -llber unsere Verh!!ltnisse' zu denken (A.I. Wittenberg, L. Wittgenstein und w. Schapp)" in Die Philosophie tmd die Wissenschaften (Festschrift for s. Moser), ed. E. Oldemeyer, Meisenheim, pp.124-44. - - ------ -- - -SCHWIZER, H.R.G. ''Wittgenstein's Picture-Theory of Langliager• ; ---... SELZ, O. ---SHWAYDER, D.S. SMITH, B. Inguir;r, 5 1 1962, as repr. in Copi and Beard, 1966, pp.271-88. --1'E:xistenz als Gegenstandsbestimmtheit", in [Lipps] 1911, pp.252-93* Uber die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs, I, Stuttgart. Wittgenstein's Tractatus : A Historical and Critical Commentary, Dissertation, Bodleian Library, Oxford. The Ontology of Reference: Studies in Logic and Phenomenology, Dissertation, Manchester University. "On the Philosophy of Sachverhalte", MS projected as an introduction to an English translation of Reinach 1911. J. l SMITH, B. c - ---- ... 1972 SPIEGELBERG, H. 1888 STOUT, G.F. : 1909/10 TITCHENER, E.B. 1929 1910/11 WARD, J. 1903 WEININGER, O. 81 BIBLIOGRAPHY "An Essay in Formal Ontology", forthcoming in Grazer Philosophische Studien, (IV, 1978). "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy", forthcoming in the Proceedings _~! the 2nd International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, Kirchberg/Wechsel, 1977. * ''V'om Erkennen des .literarischen Gegenstands", -- - - - --- ---- - forthcoming in Idee: Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie, Literaturtheorie und Kunsttheorie (vol.I) • Phenomenology in Psycholoey and Psychiatry, Evanston: Northwestern U.P. ''The Herbartian Psychology", Mind, 13, as repr.in Stout's Studies in Philosophy and Psychology, London: Macmillan, 19301 ppo1-50. A Textbook of Psychology, New York: Macmillan. Systematic Psychology: Prolegomena, New York:Macmillan. Articles on "Herbart" and on •'Psychology" in ~- yclopedia Britannica, 11th ed., Cambridge. Geschlecht und Oharakter. Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung, Vienna, 1921 WITrGENSTEIN, L. ''Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung", Annalen der 1922 1961 . ---.. 1966 1974 Naturphilosophie, 14, pp.185-262. Tractatua Logico-Philosophicus, 1st English edition of Wittgenstein 1921, *London: Routledge~ translations from the Pears-McGuinness edition of 1960. Notebooks 1914-16, ed. G.H.von Wright and G.E.M • Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwello Lectures and Oonversationa on Aesthetics, Pszch- , oiogy and Religious Belief, ed. c. Barrett, Oxford: Blackwell. Letters to Russell, Keynes,and Moore, ed~ by G.H. von W~ght, Oxford; Blackwell. f .-